You don’t get a vote. You also don’t get to ignore that they DO “identify the cause and incorporate those learnings into their training rather than quit training for the missions the fly.”
helicopter was supposed to be at or below 200’. Collision likely occurred at 350-400’
Published tower frequencies for Helo’s 134.35, Fixed wing 119.1. Hegseth has already stated that the helicopter was not at the correct altitude.
The helicopter DC charted routings are incredibly complicated.
Also mention of last minute change of runway for the RJ, although anyone who has been to DCA even one time should be prepared for that. Landing on 33 allows the tower to clear an airplane for takeoff on 36 as soon as the landing airplane is thru the intersection.
That particular Helo route is completely unacceptable from a safety standpoint. The person(s) who signed off on that route should be fired…
Hearing what the black boxes say is critical. Was the TCAS in both aircraft on? Why was a military helicopter so close to Reagan Airport? Sounds like the military helicopter battalion should be relocated to somewhere nearby with instructions to stay out of DC airspace except in an emergency or when directed by DOD. If protocols had been followed, this certainly would not have happened. Small private aircraft generally can not enter DC airspace. Which begs the question, why can a military helicopter enter DC airspace? Except for a specific reasons and during low aircraft volume times; the middle of the night! This pilot wants to know!
According to the Wall Street Journal, the President this morning “blamed diversity, equity and inclusion programs and Democrats for [a deadly midair collision] outside the nation’s capital—without citing evidence to support his assertions.”
From the helicopter chart, “Note: Pilots are expected to maintain the maximum altitude charted when ceiling permits, unless otherwise instructed by ATC”. So the question is, did ATC authorize the helicopter at the altitude it was at, presuming it was indeed above 200’ MSL.
The charted helo route is along the east shoreline. Two different flight path depictions show the helo deviating from that route to the right just before the collision.
ADS-B OUT is mandated but not ADS-B IN. How does that make any sense? I fly in some of the most congested training traffic in the US -Phoenix AZ. I would not consider flying in that or any other high-threat environment without ADS-B IN. In an emergency a pilot can deviate from any rule to the extent necessary to meet the emergency. ATC is not perfect. Pilots are not perfect. ADS-B isn’t perfect. But combining safety layers is the best way to make flying as safe as it can be.
The RNAV approach for 33 shows a glideslope of 3.1°, and the eastern shore of the Potomic is about 5300’ on the extended centerline from the aiming point. That would put the CRJ at about 288’ above the field. 1000 ft closer, which is probably closer to where the collision occurred, that drops to 233 feet. So seems very likely the collision happend right around 200 ft agl.
Not sure about you guys, but who’s to blame or what exactly happened is somehow irrelevant at this point. Eventually it will be be known.
Imagine having an empty seat at your dinner table or explaining to a 6 year old why someone who was supposed to come home, didn’t. So many people affected by this accident.
So many millions of people fly every day, never once worried about being in a midair. 99.9% of the flying public flies peacefully and safely.
Midairs are among the nastiest things to comprehend or explain to those who suffer the loss of a loved one. How does one explain all this vast open space and why on gods blue planet did these two damn aircraft have to be in the same spot at the same time?
I hope these families will find strength and survive the many story-tellers and “experts” who will offer their unlimited expertise, amongst a breath- and mercyless news and media frenzy, that will yield 0 closure or clarity.
RIP 
I was pointing out (or trying to), that 100LowLed1’s comment that “this will be the end of military training flights in Washington airspace” was not a valid response to this tragedy. I also wasn’t ignoring the purpose and result of accident investigations. The “my vote” comment was my sardonic way of pointing out that it should be obvious that if you continue flying these missions, then after the investigation determines the causes, you incorporate those learnings into the system and continue training for the missions.
Yes, there is a LOT of speculation going on here!
Fact: DCA is not an easy airport for landing due to all of the prohibited zones, namely the infamous P56 (WH). Just about all aircraft must “follow the river”.
Fact: Runway 33 is an even harder runway to land due to the restricted approach and short runway length … it’s also a circle-to-land setup runway. This is why you hear the controller ASKING the landing regionals “can you take 33?”.
Fact: DCA tower uses two frequencies for air, aircraft are on 119.1 and helos are on 134.35 (some late nights, 121.7/ground is also thrown into the mix). On most occasions to include this incident, the same controller is on both frequencies, but the pilots are not hearing each other. This is why you don’t hear any of the helo transmissions, Mussel, Blackjack, Aircare, etc.
Bottom line, DCA is not an easy landing on good days, and 33 is even harder. I do have a thought, but like others, it’s NOTHING but speculation.
I don’t understand the risk/reward of conducting night training flights with night vision in one of the most confined air spaces in the country, or why a visual separation was approved in that confined space. I also found that controller extremely difficult to understand, like maybe 60%. Enunciate and slow down.
Call it what you want. In the end, you will discover that this incident was preventable.
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You have a very valid point there
33 circle to land is not correct. There is a GPS approach that starts south of the airport and puts the aircraft on final for 33, lined up with the runway.
There has also been some speculation about the Helo being on UHF frequency which the airliner would not recieve.
To me the most bizarre part of this is the turn of the helo into the flight path of the RJ. Had the helo maintained the flightpath depicted on the helo chart it would have passed behind the RJ. Regarding frequencies Ohare has 6 VHF tower frequencies plus 1 UHF. Necessary at Ohare but a serious handicap for situational awareness.
Lots of hype about politics. Fact is that whoever was in charge for the last four years did major damage to both civilian and military aviation. Air traffic control is understaffed and overworked.
Way too much overtime and fatigued controllers. Unqualified controller candidates hired and that makes the more qualified candidates not want the jobs. 19 near misses between airliners in a relatively short period of time. Its a miracle that the DC accident does not repeat about once a month.
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1000 hours for the instructor pilot and 500 for the pilot in command of the helo is NOT highly experienced. I had 4000 hours when I got typed and Capt qualified in my first large airplane. That was the insurance minimum at that time. Other’s were at least as well qualified. I was the only one in my class to pass the rating ride the first time.
I know 33 has a GPS approach, but I still call it a circle-to-land. Even with the accident aircraft, the aircraft was lined up for 1 when the controller asked him if he could take 33 (I also noticed it took him a minute to confirm he would take 33). I know these are old, but this is from when they were actually calling it circle-to-land.
Actually from the track on the map, they appear to have been nearly perpendicular to each other on the final track. That’s one of the three classic orientations (along with head-on and tail-on) where two aircraft of similar speed don’t appear to move relative to each other, they just get bigger or their lights brighter. Maybe a factor, maybe not. Condolences to the families of those involved.