Southwest Flight Tries To Take Off On Taxiway

A Southwest crew got their aircraft up to 70 knots on a taxiway in Orlando before a controller noticed and ordered them to stop on Thursday. “3278 stop, 3278 stop. Stop Southwest 3278, stop!” CNN quoted the controller as saying. “Cancel takeoff clearance. You’re on H taxiway Southwest 3278.” The crew complied and reported they had stopped a few seconds later. They had been cleared to take off on Runway 17R which is parallel to Taxiway H.


This is a companion discussion topic for the original entry at https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/southwest-flight-tries-to-take-off-on-taxiway

That is just so cool… Another example of DPS.

Didn’t the lack of paint markings, (big giant numbers) give a hint the something wasn’t right.

“Harrison, get out of the cockpit and back to your seat in first class!”

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What a sad state of SA…
What excuse can a crew of fully qualified pilots have for such a huge error ?
Sadly, SW was my favorite airline.

Yank their License’s!!

What do you mean by DPS?

MCO has two parallel taxiways alongside 17R. A common mistake is to cross the first taxiway, then line up on the second, thinking it is the runway.

What are the funny blue lights doing on my runway?

I am wondering : 17L is hidden, its way down, not right next to 17R like 18R and 18L are. So if they werent spotting 17L perhaps they imagined 17R must be 17L, and hence taxiway must be 17R ? Just guessing as to what could cause a mixup. Also, because of the parallel taxieays at the dept end, except when you get the very first there may well not be numbers, at least not in front of you. Its weird and i feel for them.

It means “Dumb Pilot Shit.”

Some years ago, Nashville had a situation where that was trying to happen frequently. A new runway had been built and I believe the old turned into a parallel taxiway. Everybody from AAL to AAL commuters tried it. Several of the commuters actually got airborne. The Airport authority used every imaginable legal marking to properly identify it as a taxiway. They finally had to just cut up a portion of a taxiway that led on to it. Taxiway sierra.

Over the past year, we’ve had numerous aviation mishaps, many tragic ones. A good deal of these were commercial aircraft operations. As a retired Naval Aviator and ATP, with over 10,000 hours flying the P3-C nearly world-wide, it’s incredibly hard to comprehend how two (2) WN pilots, a captain and a F/O could mistake a Class “A” Airport taxiway for the runway.

What makes this more troubling, is the fact that each of these pilots was line certified and presumably with extensive operational experience.

Given this, I have to question how these two elevated to their current positions with so little understanding of what differentiates a taxiway from a runway. And, to image the started the t/o roll with no situational awareness whatsoever.

This is the kind of pilot error that absolutely shouldn’t happen give the ratings and so-called experience of each pilot.

I’m going to guess the hurried pre takeoff check list is a big culprit. Especially with SWA, with their desire to be ready to go without slowing as they approach the runway, sometimes one of the pilots is still finishing up a few items even as the plane rolls onto the runway. Chief pilot, slow it down just a bit and insure you’re letting them do it right. The extra fuel burned will be off set by the new baggage fees…right.

Roger, I respect your assessment, but completely disagree with it. There is no excuse for the error that was made.

No matter how rushed or hurried you are, your habit patterns, discipline, and rigor should be exercised every flight so that mistakes like the one made by the WN crew never happen.

It’s almost incomprehensible that these two pilots lined up on the YELLOW center line of the taxiway, with no other determinable runway markings, and initiated a t/o.

While I feel bad for these two pilots, I have to question their competency based on their ratings and experience.

There have been hundreds of thousands of military and commercial pilots who fly 30+ year careers and never make this mistake.

This was likely a mix of rushed procedures, a tricky airport layout, and some visual confusion. Even seasoned crews can get tripped up when they’re feeling the heat to keep things moving. Fatigue, distractions, or just plain assumption can sneak in, making it easy to skip that final check. Thankfully, the controller had his head on a swivel and caught it in time. Incidents like this remind us why solid checklist habits and clear runway markings matter. Bottom line: always stay sharp.

I agree with you on one point - knowing the runway environment, it’s several major markings, and maintaining solid “situation awareness” are the keys to not letting this kind of incident happen. Frankly, it had nothing to do with checklists. If you’re using a checklist to find a runway, then I’m not sure you were training properly.

As a mishap/incident investigator, ATP and retired Naval Aviator, I believe the primary casual factor, notwithstanding all the events and circumstances that led to this incident, comes down to simply this - pilot error. Whatever contributed to the foul up will reveal some clear lapses in pilot knowledge, orientation, awareness, and finally, skill.

Again, flying in and of itself can tolerate errors, but only those that aren’t significant enough to led to major incidents and accidents.

I feel bad for both these pilots, but I have to question their fundamental ability to perform at the commercial airline pilot level. To line up on a solid YELLOW taxiway center line and believe you’re on the assigned runway with t/o clearance is almost incomprehensible. This is a mistake a student pilot might make with 30 to 40 hours.

Mark, I appreciate your perspective, and you’re absolutely right, strong situational awareness and fundamental knowledge of the runway environment are critical. No checklist alone can substitute for that, and I agree that lining up on a yellow taxiway line is a serious error that shouldn’t happen at any operational level.

That said, I’d offer a thought on what might be missing from the discussion. While pilot error is certainly the core issue here, I wonder if this was more of a crew error, not as an excuse, but as a way to better understand the root of the problem.

CRM principles are designed to catch these kinds of lapses before they escalate. A well-trained Pilot Monitoring (PM), in support of the Pilot Flying (PF), plays a crucial role in preventing these errors. The PM’s responsibilities go beyond routine monitoring, they are expected to actively observe, verify, and assist throughout the flight. Ideally, the PM should have questioned the runway alignment or called attention to those yellow markings.

CRM also emphasizes recognizing distractions, fatigue, or task overload, any of which could have contributed in this case. The PM’s role is to help manage those factors by maintaining a second layer of defense, monitoring instruments, confirming checklist completion, and speaking up if something doesn’t seem right.

I agree this is a tough one to explain, and like you, I feel for the pilots. But I believe there’s value in looking beyond just individual skill and examining how better crew coordination might have made a difference. Sometimes the best pilots, even those with solid fundamentals, still need a teammate to speak up at the right moment.

Curious to hear your thoughts on how CRM fits into this.

Hi Mark. I hear what you’re saying. But I believe that company culture can contribute to situations like this, and as a former ATC, SWA had a reputation of hurry, hurry (or don’t get between one and the gate after it lands). On the west coast the very wonderful PSA airlines had that reputation years ago. We loved it because whatever you needed, they would do for you. That usually broke the tie in their favor because you could count on them. But that culture certainly contributed to their horrible mid air accident in Sept. '78. They fudged on seeing another aircraft and even in the cockpit admitted they didn’t really know where it was. But by saying they did, they got cleared for a visual approach to maintain visual separation. They ran over the other guy. But on another subject, I certainly love your company’s culture, the US Navy. My recently departed brother-in-law was a retired Master Chief. I was a lowly 4 year USAF SSgt. He reminded me of that frequently. And a high school friend of mine recently died. Admiral Joe Mobley. Five years prisoner in Vietnam. Such admiration of him and all military. But back to culture, I was a controller at ORD. We prided ourselves on there was nothing we couldn’t handle or make work. And that was pretty much true. But the truth was our culture pressure to always do that did push us into compromising occasionally what we personally knew was a little tight. We recognized the always need to keep it safe, but we sincerely thought we could do that by fudging the rules as we felt necessary. I think SWA and know PSA did/does that occasionally.