The NTSB and FAA are investigating a runway incursion at Nashville International Airport on Thursday in which an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 MAX crew rejected its takeoff at about 130 knots when a Southwest 737-700 crossed the far end of the runway it was using. Both aircraft had been cleared by controllers and the Alaska crew made the decision to hit the brakes, flattening at least two main gear tires. It's not clear how close the two aircraft got.
Is it “lack of understanding”, “lack of training”, “lack of procedures” , “lack of equipment”, “lack of work ethic”. This is too common. We need to tighten the reins and get some descent structure.
I learned to fly in1971 and flew professionally for 42 years. There was obviously a mistake made by ATC, but do people not look out the windows? I was taught that when crossing any runaway active or not, to look both directions to verify the runways were clear and nobody on final. In low visibility to always confirm clearance a second time before crossing.
Different frequencies, (ground, tower) may have contributed to the incursion. Monitor tower during taxi, small cockpit, small windows, big airport. Good to know that the Alaska crew had their stuff together .
I was a supervisor there many years ago. At the time the ground controller had to get verbal approval from the local controller to cross a runway. Had to ask specifically and get specific approval.
It’s been awhile since I was an active tower controller. But in those days there was always a strip on the board indicating when an aircraft was using a runway, which was shared by tower and ground.
So not only could one look outside, but the strip board clearly indicated that the runway was occupied. Made it very simple to avoid these sorts of serious errors - there was something physical that you touched to indicate something was there.
But I don’t know what system is used in Nashville. I suspect maybe these things have gone digital, eliminating the physical feedback element?
Article says crossing aircraft was at far end of the departure runway, so may not have been visible with runway slope or other visibility factors. Possible both aircraft on different frequencies.
I just wonder if it wouldn’t have been safer to continue the take-off. If the other aircraft was at the end of the runway, a) it may well have crossed by the time the departing one arrived, and b) the departing aircraft would have been at a sufficient altitude to be safe.
I was thinking the same thing Charles but since we don’t know what could happen, Alaska may very well have needed the far end of the runway in case something… bad… happened.
Logic says the departing plane WOULD be airborne before the end of the runway. Probability says the crossing aircraft is POSSIBLY to be clear by the time it got there. Reason says better safe than sorry, especially when you have seconds to perceive, analyze and react when you are busy taking off. I’d love to see what the NTSB has to say about it, especially the part that ATC played.
The system you speak of required good adherence to the procedure of placing and removing the strip on the board in concert with verbal instructions and clearances, given that good visibility to the ends of the runway was beyond the control of humans. That means the system was subject to human reliability which is impacted by natural human shortcomings that emerge with workload, fatigue, distraction, attention span, multitasking, etc. If operations were “digitized” so as to not provide better safety than the system it replaced or provided improvements in one area but marked deterioration in another that may be an indication of a poorly thought out or unnecessary transition. More likely it is an indication of the utter lack of imagination and initiative at the aviation regulatory and safety agencies. If Siri can recognize the accents, diction, vocabulary and idiosyncratic syntax of millions of people talking to their smartphone’s digital assistant, surely it can recognize the limited vocabulary of the pilot-controller glossary? THAT would be true digitization. It wouldn’t take a miracle of technology to then have a computer track where a flight is supposed to be (or is) on the ground based on the controllers transmissions and the flight’s response, even spanning multiple frequencies from clearance delivery, ground control, tower, departure, arrival. The system wouldn’t make taxi routing decisions or issue clearances, but would raise an alarm if one airplane was cleared to cross a runway immediately after another was cleared for takeoff, or if one was forgotten after being told to line up and wait and then another was cleared to land on the same runway. Just a supervisory function listening and monitoring, like a human supervisor looking over the shoulder of a controller, but with far greater reliability. Lord knows we humans need all the help we can get. Attempting to simply “train” humans out of their natural limitations is a daft endeavour.
If one stops and thinks about it, having our ATC systems entirely dependent on VHF (or HF) radio is kinda nuts.
There is a lot better ways it could be done today, but it would be a serious overhaul that would require international standardization and re-equipping.
But then, ADSB is required for a lot of airspace nowadays, so not entirely unprecedented.