The U.S. Air Force announced yesterday it will phase out A-10 Thunderbolt II (aka “Warthog”) attack aircraft in Korea in favor of fourth- and fifth-generation fighters such as the F-15, F-16, and F-35. “The modernization effort seeks to ensure peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region,” the USAF said, “including the Korean peninsula, through state-of-the-art aircraft.”
Why not converting a number of A10’s to drone capability and see what they can accomplish in hostile territories? I think lots of people consider the A10 a very good air/ground combat platform that can deliver the firepower where needed and survive to return to the theatre.
If we were to rate these aircraft based on their effectiveness in ground support (specifically close air support or CAS), the A-10 would come out on top. Here’s a rough breakdown in percentage terms for each aircraft’s effectiveness at ground support, with considerations for loitering time, precision, survivability, and suitability for the CAS mission:
A-10 Thunderbolt II (“Warthog”)
Effectiveness: 95%
Reasoning: The A-10 was purpose-built for CAS. It can loiter at low altitudes, deliver precise and devastating fire with its GAU-8/A cannon, and endure ground fire due to its armored design. Its slow speed and maneuverability allow it to stay close to ground forces and respond quickly to threats, making it the ideal aircraft for direct support.
F-16 Fighting Falcon
Effectiveness: 70%
Reasoning: The F-16 is a versatile, multirole fighter that can perform CAS effectively with precision-guided munitions (PGMs). However, it lacks the A-10’s armor and loiter time at low altitudes, making it more vulnerable in prolonged engagements and less efficient for sustained support close to the ground. It’s agile and effective but not purpose-built for CAS.
F-15 Eagle (F-15E Strike Eagle or F-15EX)
Effectiveness: 65%
Reasoning: The F-15E, configured for ground attack, has a high payload and advanced targeting systems, which make it effective for striking ground targets. However, it’s designed for high-speed operations, lacks armor, and doesn’t have the low-speed maneuverability or loitering capability of the A-10. It’s useful for certain types of strikes but not ideal for direct support in contested environments.
F-35 Lightning II
Effectiveness: 60%
Reasoning: The F-35’s stealth and advanced sensor suite make it useful for CAS in heavily defended areas where the A-10 might struggle. However, it lacks armor, and while it can perform precision strikes, its high cost, limited loiter time, and faster speed make it less suited for prolonged, close-range support. It’s an effective multirole platform but is not tailored to CAS in the same way as the A-10.
Summary
In terms of ground support effectiveness for prolonged and direct CAS, the A-10 stands out with the highest rating due to its purpose-driven design, durability, and precision for close-in support. The F-16, F-15, and F-35 are versatile in ground attack roles but don’t match the A-10’s resilience and dedication to staying with ground forces in intense, prolonged scenarios. (ChatGPT 4o)
As a guy who served on the A-10 Test Team way back in the 70’s at Edwards AFB, I think this move is a GIGANTIC mistake. The astounding number 30mm rounds coming out of an A-10 cannot be matched by any of these other platforms. Ask any ground pounder who has been saved by an A-10. The ‘woke’ commanders doing this in the USAF ought to be ashamed of themselves. It befuddles me WHY they keep trying to do away with a purpose built machine that DOES its job SO well it cannot be replaced.
Since this is only in Korea, it makes sense.
To me it seems that there are now plenty of good stand-off weapons to take care of both N. Korean tanks or waves of N. Korean army soldiers. That, and F-15/16’s are a hell of a lot better in the dual role of air-to-air defense. Win-Win.
How about for fun we paint one up Spirit Airline’s livery and fly it into Haiti? Then when the idiots shoot at the “airliner” can locate and correct the problem.
It’s a little of an overkill, but sometimes the remaining idiots get the lesson.
The A-10 is certainly one of the most effective ground attack and support aircraft ever built. BUT, it was designed for combat in a different era. It was introduced in 1977, when air defenses were not as sophisticated or effective as those of today. Over a contested battlefield against a modern, well equipped military, its survival rate would suffer. Lacking stealth capabilities, the A-10 would be easy prey for modern air defense systems, MANPADS, and advanced fighters.
Increasingly, conflicts are not being waged over well-established “contested battlefields” with “established air defenses”, e.g. Haiti. Say what you will about remote-controlled CAS, drones can’t carry a whole lot of depleted uranium very far. I’m with Raf on this one.
Everything stated here is why the ‘Hog’ has lasted so-long in the USAF inventory… and was effective in Afghanistan and Iraq. The ‘Hog’ deserves the respect it has earned in the fight… BUT…
What is not well understood is that the LOGISTICS for maintaining the A-10 is becoming untenable… and the aircraft cannot survive for long in the battle air-space of 2020s+.
The aircraft design evolved in the early 1970s with Vietnam and European cold-war battle/tactics/threats up-front and foremost. The first production A-10A was ‘fielded in 1975’… which makes the A-10 the oldest tactical aircraft in the US/Allied air forces inventory. I checked… 713 total were built and only ~280 remain in service.
ALSO, note that the company that built them… Fairchild Republic [LI, NY] is long- gone… was ‘replaced’ by a conglomeration led by Northrop-Grumman. Also the remaining aircraft have undergone a transition from ‘round-dials’ to full glass panels and latest battle avionics system… just to keep on par with the world in the 2000’s… and stay just ahead of obsolescence.
The original structure, landing gear, engines and mechanical system are still 1970s/1980s production-vintage. In fact, the boneyard at Davis-Monthan AFB [AMARG] is the only source of spares for major components, just mentioned… which is a subtle reason why so many jets have already been retired. In-fact just to keep this small number of jets flying… I was obvious that they needed new/tougher WINGS starting +25-years ago… to extend their fatigue service life without load/G limitations.
Also, the Ukraine war has already proven WHY the jet is essentially obsolete. The modern battlefield is flooded with air defense missiles/guns and would be unsurvivable for the for ‘Hog’. OK the jet airframe is designed to take punishing battle damage… and may allow the jet to survive for return to base… but repairing the damage for return-to-the fight would be impossible as battles wear-on.
In summary… The ‘Hog’ is a aging warrior and the ‘airspace-realm’ that the ‘Hog’ fly’s within… low and relatively slow… has become too deadly.
I love the A-10, but the drones on both sides of the Russian invasion of Ukraine have been extremely effective against heavy armor - without depleted uranium. Including against the vaunted M1A1 Abrams. Reportedly, half of the Abrams provided to Ukraine have been destroyed by drones. I’m guessing the guys in the boots want quick, effective, and abundant ground support and don’t really care what system provides it. I doubt a handful of A-10s check all those boxes and when they’re gone they’re gone. Ukraine (and I assume Russia as well), are now producing millions of drones a year - essentially a limitless supply.
It is correct that our last conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were fought against poorly equipped militaries or militias. But as history has shown us over and over, it is a mistake to plan and equip your military to fight the “last” wars fought in. Our next conflicts have a high probability of being with North Korea, Iran, China, Russia, or one of their proxies who will be trained and equipped by them. The low and slow A-10, even armored as it is would have a low survivability.
Unfortunately the A 10 has been in the inventory a LOT longer than it usefulness will show. the use of small short range unmanned aircraft is showing to the world the vulnerability of the current armored group. this was determined to be a serious problem in the early 1990s with the development of the top attack family of field artillery. In other word using a flying cannon to open up the top of a tank is a very expensive , poorly survivable answer to the problem of the armored attack when compared to the sophisticated tool attack mortar round or now the short range GPOS, or laser targeted top attack UAV. SO while the Aircraft comparison seem neat to justify the system . it is now an unsurvivable aircraft that for short range non challenged airspace replaced by UAVs and top attack mortars, and for challenged airspace by F 35 and the F 16 w top attack guided munitions.
Based on the arguments presented here agreeing with the retirement of the A10, would the same arguments apply to the Army’s Apache or the Marines Cobra helicopters? Helicopters are even slower and less protected than the A10. How well would they survive in today’s antiaircraft environment? I still wonder if this is another attempt by the Air Force to drop the close air support mission, just like dropping the airborne jamming mission when the EF111 were retired.
Exactly! Retiring the A-10 signals a broader shift to reduce the Air Force’s role in the CAS mission, effectively leaving the Army and Marine Corps to fill the gap with their attack helicopters—or perhaps with their own versions of an A-10-like platform tailored to their needs.
Don’t discount the effectiveness of Marine pilots, flying Marine aircraft to provide effective CAS to Marine ground combat elements. More than 30 years ago, flying F/A 18s, we could easily best all comers (A10s included) in bombing derbys or in the field, providing accuracy and responsiveness while supporting Marine units. I doubt that fixed wing Marine Aviation is less effective today than it was when I last hung up my G-suit.