Originally published at: Telecom Failure Disrupts Northeast Air Traffic
Primary circuit failure and a severed backup fiber line prompted ground stops at airports across the region.
Having worked in telecom, I am continually amazed of the apparent lack of planning and redundancy in the FAAs ‘s systems.
I was always taught that back ups should be alternate vendors AND alternate physical routes (eg, you don’t want your Verizon lines going in the same trench as ATT, or go through the same telephone exchange buildings.) Additionally, backups should have active monitoring to alert network operations that they are down BEFORE they are needed.
In the case of critical communications like this, I’d go as far as triple redundancy, just in case.
There should never be a single point of failure, and if there is, at the very least a ‘warm spare’ should be in place to effect disaster recovery in minimal time.
This isn’t a Republican or democratic issue. It’s a systemic issue that has to be addressed. It’s been allowed to develop through multiple governments.
Incompetence in not monitoring the fiber optic link.
Note marking of cable location was inaccurate, a common problem with natural gas lines to buildings where I live - contractors route line around a boulder in ground but do not tell utility what they did. (These days last length of line is flexible.)
Can contractors tell where items are? Yes, ground penetrating radar but it takes interpretation.
(I’ve commented earlier on cases of duplicate telecomm cables and natural gas pipelines being too close to each other thus prone to both being damaged by equipment of land shift.)