At a Washington, D.C. press briefing this afternoon, National Transportation Safety Board chair Jennifer Homendy announced an urgent recommendation to the FAA to prohibit helicopter operations on the designated helicopter Route 4 near Washington’s Ronald Reagan National Airport (DCA) when Runway 15/33 is in operation. The announcement included release of the NTSB Preliminary Report on the January 29 nighttime midair collision involving a U.S. Army UH60L helicopter and American Airlines/PSA Flight 5342, a Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI – formerly Bombardier) CRJ700 regional jet. Flight 5342 was on a circling approach to Runway 33 when it collided with the Black Hawk, which was following Route 4. They crashed into the Potomac River, killing all 67 on board both aircraft.
If it can be proven who approved that route, Army, FAA or both, they should be indicted and tried for manslaughter. They should also have their “ticket pulled”.
Mark, excellent work on your article. You laid out the facts plain as day and called it like it is–a good piece that cuts through the noise. Well done.
The NTSB’s chart is exactly the kind of clear and impactful presentation that drives the point home. It illustrates the issue so effectively that little else needs to be said.
The NTSB is more than correct in calling for the closure of Route 4, and frankly, it’s a no-brainer. On a proper 3° glide slope (2 White / 2 Red), there’s only 57 feet of breathing room above the helicopter route’s upper limit. Fly just slightly low (1 White / 3 Red) on a 2.8° glide slope, and that margin shrinks to ~40 feet. Now toss in potential altimeter error of up to -75 feet, and you’ve got a situation where an aircraft could unknowingly dip below the helicopter route’s ceiling.
Shutting down Route 4 isn’t just the right call, it’s the only call.
When Homendy says, “It was more than an oversight. We used data [from safety reporting systems] that was available to the FAA. They could have used that data to determine that we have a trend here—and a problem—and looked at that route. That didn’t occur.”
The oversight should also be considered an oversight by the NTSB not being proactive. For example, the NTSB does proactive measures on pedestrian safety, in 2018 they did ‘proactive’ safety when Air Canada lined up on wrong runway at SFO. Why not here? Was it an oversight?
The NTSB’s independence was created because when they were part of FAA/DOT the fear was they would be hesitant to fault their own agency (I.e., FAA). With independence, can they ever fault themselves?
Hypothetically could a NTSB probable cause ever say “contributing to this accident was the failure of the NTSB and FAA to use existing data to …” and then recommendations to say “…the NTSB to take a proactive stance when …”
That should be obvious. The job of safety oriented bureaucracies like the FAA and NTSB is to ensure the safety of their own careers, not your or my actual physical safety. If that means throwing another agency under the bus to divert attention away from themselves, then so be it.
It’s like how everyone hates on Boeing for the 737 Max disaster, but very few actually talk about how the FAA sat on its hands for years until airplanes started falling out of the sky. Even then, it was the last regulatory agency on the planet to ground the airplane. The FAA effectively refused to do it’s legally mandated regulatory job and virtually nobody has brought them to task for that.
Having flown with navigation instruments from none to WAAS enabled ADS-B, the capability of the Blackhawk should have easily avoided the descending aircraft on approach to Runway 33 at KDCA. The NTSB is probably correct in denying the use of Route 4 when 15 and 33 are in use. Nonetheless, having a functioning WASS ADS-B unit the helo pilots would easily have seen the distance, height and direction where the aircraft descending and would have appeared. Also helo crew would nave know their own altitude within a few feet. This info would also have given the ATC controller much earlier that the two aircraft could be on a collision course. With all that said, it was up to the Blackhawk crew to avoid the descending aircraft. While they had nightvision gear, they actually made the ADS-B equipment even more essential.
The NTSB must have rule making authority, to force the FAA to change or make regulations like this.
The NTSB can only make recommendations, while the FAA can take years , if ever,to implement them.!
Wow, that chart needs to be reproduced and distributed to every CFI and shared with every student receiving instruction. I have never seen a clearer demonstration of the need to not blindly trust the wisdom or infallibility of the professionals who are not in the cockpit with you. Often times we cynically point out how easily a controller error can kill you. So can regulators’.
The maxim “Just because it is legal, doesn’t mean it is safe” has never been more clear.
Nitpick here. The NTSB graphic was soooo not to scale that my literal-minded brain went to work trying to figure out how it might have been deceiving.
Raf’s text description was far better, because it was rigrously accurate.
I respectfully disagree on giving NTSB regulatory authority. To many items the NTSB has wanted would practically shut down several segments of aviation in this country. VFR flight and skydiving are examples. Problem with DCA is that Congress has overridden past attempts by regulators and the Secret Service to further restrict or just shut down DCA entirely. Since GA has been for the most part banned from DCA, the regulators have no one else to scapegoat on this accident. Until Congress finally owns up to this very little will change at DCA.
You’ve probably never heard of it, but the FAA has had an “independent” oversight entity for over 20 years called the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service. It’s existence satisfies a requirement for being a member of ICAO. Their managment team often includes people that came directly from the ATO’s Safety and Technical Training (AJI) office who will likely be trying to get a job back in the ATO after their stint in AOV is over. This creates an internal filter that prevents anything from being evaluated or reported because if your team pisses off the ATO and NATCA, you’re never going to get back to the ATO.
Seriously, the media should ask the FAA what AOV has done about these problems and then FOIA the heck out of them. It shouldn’t take long to get the results - they don’t do anything.