As a former airline pilot, I believe this collision begins with whomever approved a helicopter corridor through the short, short finals of airplanes approaching from the south into DCA. To me, the altitudes are a moot point because anywhere on the river is not safe.
Using a standard 3-degree glide path of approximately 300’ per mile, starting at 1,500’ at 5 miles out, would put the CRJ somewhere near a barber shop on the south bank of the Potomac at 300’ at one mile. Using this landing structure, the CRJ would be around 150’ at mid river, if they were to touch down on the numbers, which I would do, considering the shorter runway, instead of a typical ILS with a runway point of intersection being around 775’ down from the threshold.
I recommend any aviators on this site to take a look at your regular home airport and compare this to DCA’s southern approaches and just where this collision occurred. The Black Hawk could not have been safe at any altitude.
Like C Lynch’s post, it is just inconceivable that this helicopter corridor was approved in the first place.
My next point which is clear to me as a former military and FAA air traffic controller, is that the controller allowed this collision to happen. To use an excuse that the Black Hawk confirmed the CRJ insight and could maintain visual does not relieve the controller of avoiding a collision. ATC and Pilots make mistakes all the time, daily, but it is up to everyone to be on a constant vigil to see, know or realize that something is awry. At five miles apart, I could see this would be a problem. I believe the controller had three aircraft at the time. They have a big radar screen in the tower can, which clearly indicates the aircraft and the altitudes. ATC literally watched them collide. It was very obvious to me after looking at the radar, that this was a problem. Again, 100, 200 or 300’ on their radar, time lapses of flash to bang hitting the target and receiving the response were not a factor.
Finally, as a retired Army Black Hawk pilot, I can guarantee you that flying with NVG’s is extremely tiring and demanding. They are very heavy esp. with the counterbalance pack on the back of the helmet. They would’ve had a head’s up display on the nods to give them altitude info., but it is very difficult at night, I believe, to maintain exactly that altitude so low. They may have had the nods in the up position also, because of the bright lights and the possibility of whiteout. The newer models help prevent that but it is still difficult to see. Field of view is 80 degrees so it is imperative to keep your head on a swivel. A side note is that in my career as a Huey and Black Hawk pilot, I’ve made several airport crossings, but they were always midfield up at altitude. I personally would never accept a crossing at night, nods or not, through a final approach course, not to mention the extreme difficulty of orientation with night VFR (I do not consider night VFR a viable and safe mode of transportation any more) and the possibility of wake turbulence. What was that controller thinking, “fly behind?” No way! If they weren’t restricted to 200’ and could fly over land a few miles to the south I might consider the fly-behind-solution.
One more point which isn’t related to altitudes, is that I personally have visited the Pat VIP unit with the VIP kits installed on the Black Hawks. That was in 1994 when one of my colleagues from flight school was stationed there. They had no CW2’s or WO1’s assigned there, only senior warrant officers because this was the highest VIP unit in the Army. They were in the 2,000 to 5,000 hour level. When I was stationed at Coleman Barracks in the early ‘80’s, flying VIP internationally throughout Europe, WO1’s were not allowed to fly general officers. So to see such low time pilots, flying at the Army’s highest VIP unit, VFR at night through this extremely busy and allegedly very controlled airspace is mind-boggling.
That is all.