Oh yes… and please add to your collection of Boeing’s wrongs, the bad design of the rear attachment points of the main Landing Gear of the B777… discovered by the English AAIB when reviewing the British Airways B777 Crash that landed short at London. And not only did the British AAIB performed that good job, they also identified that “the Fire estinguisher handles also have the effect of cutting off power to the fuel switches, meaning that the fuel may continue to flow – a potentially dangerous situation.” The report restated a previous Boeing Service Bulletin giving procedural advice that fuel switches should be operated before fire handles. It went on: “This was not causal to the accident but could have had serious consequences in the event of a fire during the evacuation.” Indeed another example of lack of engineering supervision at Boeing, and that accident happened back in 2009, which reveals that the quality of design and engineering at Boeing has gone bad since that era… it is not only the B737MAX which is wrong. Add to thst the risky selection of hhe Lithium.batteries on the B787 and the recently discovered wiring and composote construction faults… too much going bad for too long.
That is ANOTHER bad design in the latest Boeing cost cutting and penny saving practices!
Sully lives in the bay area, mostly liberals. He’s married to that TV news anchor, whom as a group, are over 90% left wing. So him being a Biden supporter is no surprise. But coming out publicly announcing his support for Biden is an abuse of his fame from the flt 1549 publicity he received. Also the airline pilot group does have some democrats, since most of them were union members during their careers.
Laughable Steve if your logic wasn’t so pathetic. I wouldn’t trust your judgement were you sitting to the right of me in a cockpit for fear you’d choose to pull out a checklist based on politics rather than phase of flight or indicated anomalies.
After reading all of the comments that were posted after I made mine, I feel compelled to add the following:
Ad hominem attacks on Capt. Sullenberger are fallacious and irrelevant. They are also rather childish.
Pilot error is all too common. So is using pilots as scapegoats, to evade responsibility for faulty design.
Boeing has a long and unenviable record of cutting corners, sacrificing safety to expediency and profit,
and of “wining and dining” Congress to curry favor, gain lucrative contracts, and escape penalties for
failure to comply with federal aviation regulations. I cited the literature on this topic earlier. Thus
there is prima-facie reason to suspect Boeing of doing more of the same, which in fact they did with
regard to the 737-MAX, in at least a dozen ways. Further details are in my essay, also cited above.
The chief causes of pilot error are (a) fatigue (b) distraction. Fatigue did not play a role in either of
the fatal crashes that occured in 2018, Distraction did. Even the most competent, experienced,
and level-headed pilots are susceptible to that. In both cases (Lion Air, Ethiopian Airways), not just
the pilot but the entire crew was distracted (and upset) by a series of flashing lights that were both
startling and wholly unexpected. The more they reacted to these “false alarms,” the more that they
inadvertently created the actual conditions that made them stall, then spin out of control, and crash.
That was not their fault. It was Boeing’s fault, for not telling them that the computer systems were
federated, not integrated, and for not giving them any prior warning, let alone a (new) manual for
the aircraft, to prepare them for that. They received no training, either on the ground or in the air,
and thus were left in the dark, in ignorance that was far from blissful, when the moment of truth
confronted them. Puzzled by the mystery, they acted on assumptions that were false and thus
proved fatal. Their actions were entirely reasonable; they were flying blind, as it were, and the
passengers and crew on both flights paid the ultimate price for what can only be described as
criminal negligence by the Boeing corporation, its subsidiaries and subcontractors, and its high-
level executives. That is all there is to it–that and the ongoing corruption in the entire industry.
One further point. If Boeing fixed everything properly, there would be no need for a device to
override or turn off the stick shaker. That much is true. But since (as Sullenberger observed)
they aren’t about to do that, but will in all likelihood release planes for commercial use in the
near future that are only partially rather than completely airworthy, pilots will have to cope
with a succession of “minor” flaws and defects, of which that annoying stick shaker is one.
Sully’s point is that it’s better to have one less distraction in the cockpit, so that the crew
can concentrate on everything else they have to do, and do quickly, especially in case of
an emergency. There is nothing illogical about that. Rather, it is Boeing that persists,
both in begging the question and in refusing to do anything more than patch work, while
risking the lives of everyone on board for the sake of cutting their losses (sic), satisfying
their shareholders, and engaging in big business as usual–callous, indifferent, obscene.
To put it bluntly, you can’t expect pilots to compensate for a “half-assed” repair job by
performing miracles, be it on the Hudson, the Nile, the Amazon, or the Mississippi river.
Yet that is exactly what Boeing is doing–and, with the complicity of the government,
they will get away with it, and laugh all the way to the federal bank to collect their
insurance for “acts of God” that were written off as unforeseen and unpreventable.
When (alas) it happens again, ask not for whom Boeing tolls. Surely not for thee.
A non-sequitor? “A non sequitur is a conversational literary device, often used for comedic purposes. It is something said that, because of its apparent lack of meaning relative to what preceded it, seems absurd to the point of being humorous or confusing. This use of the term is distinct from the non sequitur in logic, where it is a fallacy.” He meant what he said, and not for comedic purpose. And certainly isn’t absurd nor lack meaning.
My first thought when I read the story. With the weather radar capabilities of today it’s hard to believe that they didn’t secure the helos and they had no warning?
The person in charge at the top should be fired as well as those charged with securing . They should also loose their retirement. That would be the same for the loss of the F-18 unless their was a failure of the hold downs. I do like and have gratitude for those in the military, i did my time. With all the weather information they had there is no excuse for this. What has happened to discipline?
I worked on F-14D’s at NAS Oceana (Grumman subcontractor) at the same time ('90 - '91). I loved the work, but the weather was harsh on this California boy. Don’t get me started on the thunderstorms… ferocious doesn’t even begin to descibe them. I too wonder what genius ignored the weather forecasts and didn’t tie those helos down.