Nine Navy Helicopters Damaged In Storm - AVweb

It might be the most powerful in the world but the U.S. Navy seems to have trouble battling the weather. A month after losing a $30 million to $60 million F/A-18 overboard from a carrier, at least nine helicopters were seriously damaged at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, on July 26 when a powerful thunderstorm blew through. “We can confirm that nine helicopters located at Naval Station Norfolk Chambers Field sustained damage while on deck at the airfield following a severe storm that occurred in the area July 26,” Naval Air Force Atlantic said in a statement to Navy Times Wednesday. “Known damages to the aircraft span from broken tail and rotor blades to structural dents and punctures in the airframes.”


This is a companion discussion topic for the original entry at https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/nine-navy-helicopters-damaged-in-storm

I had enormous respect for this man. Until he said Biden is what the country needs. So how do we know that he knows what the MAX needs??

“He said he also agrees with Transport Canada that there should be a switch to turn off the stick shaker when pilots are sure it was triggered erroneously.“
Am I missing something here? While I agree with a switch or anything for that matter to turn off a stick shaker, isn’t the above statement kind of like completely missing the point of trying to fix the Max. If pilots are sure the stick shaker has been activated erroneously, isn’t that in and of itself confirmation a problem still exists? And, isn’t the installation of a switch to turn off the stick shaker an acknowledgment that pilots are still flying the Max with a known defect that has yet to be discovered by them?
To me, it sounds like the authorities are willing to return the plane to service knowing there are still undiscovered problems with no known solutions, however, just in case pilots happen to stumble across one of those unknown problems, here’s a button you can push, or, switch you can flip to turn off the stick shaker just in case that happens to be a solution to the problem at hand.
Maybe I’m just getting to old, but, something doesn’t seem right here. I’m starting to think the “machine’s” are really starting to take over the world, or, at least airplanes anyway.

The AOA is already derived from vane position and then combined with flap, slat, gear positions and ground affects inputs.

The discussion was synthetic airspeed from the 787, not ‘digital AOA’

The crews couldn’t follow a checklist and perform stab cutout. They raised flaps with the stick shaker going off enabling MCAS. How will providing a switch to turn off stick shaker help?

When Sully speaks, he speaks truth. And Congress should listen, as they did (reluctantly) when he
testified before them last year about the 737-MAX. All of his points are valid and highly important,
and should be acted upon now, not later–or after another fatal accident has occurred. As for what
others say, (1) the first comment [about Biden] is both fatuous and a non sequitur. (2) the second
comment [about stick shakers] is simply absurd. If the pilot is certain that the stick shaker has been
turned on by mistake, it is imperative to turn it off immediately, before it interferes with everything
else the flight crew is doing, and wreaks havoc with their ability to control the aircraft or land safely.
It is also one less nuisance, like the flashing lights that distract pilots and thus impair concentration.
It does not mean that they are ignoring the plane’s multiple defects–on the contrary, they are well
aware of them, or they wouldn’t be trying to cope with so many of them, simultaneously. Machines
don’t control the world, but they will if we let them–and if we ruin it for ourselves by giving them a
chance to prove just how illogical, incompetent and insipid we humans are. They won’t die; we will.

“something must be done about the cacophony of alarms and flashing lights that assault pilots when something goes wrong with the MAX.”

That’s not a situation unique to the MAX. As I recall, wasn’t there a a “cacophony of alarms and flashing lights” on US1549? And on Quantas 32?

Why do people keep holding this guy out as possessing special insight and knowledge? He was a line pilot. Lots of those around.

So you would have retained your respect for this man if he would have said we should stay the course, and everything’s great?

No one can question the abilities and experience of Capt. Sully. However, he spent the last few years of his career flying the Airbus. I have a lot of respect for him and the crew that assisted him. All of this notwithstanding, has anyone ever answered the question as to why there were never any incidents with US carriers on the 737MAX? Southwest, American, etc. etc. aircrews flew the MAX in varied conditions, and yet not one incident that I am aware of. (Correct me if I am wrong) Makes one ask the question, what about aircrew training, and what role did that play?

Perhaps US aircrews are the best trained in the world. Does that mean that Boeing should be building airplanes that are safe only in their hands? You can bet that Boeing has a very good idea of the level of training of their customers around the world - if they didn’t, why would they have created the MCAS in the first place? To make the MAX feel just like a “normal” 737? Who needs that if every pilot and crew flying it are the best trained in the world? The failure of the MCAS is firmly on Boeing’s shoulders, but with an assist from the FAA for letting them self-regulate as much as they did.

Maybe people hold him out as possessing special insight and knowledge because he does have special insight and knowledge. Just a guess.

From his wikipedia entry, which is heavily sourced, it appears that in addition to having been a line pilot, he was

  • founder and CEO of Safety Reliability Methods, Inc. (SRM), a firm providing strategic and tactical guidance to enhance organizational safety, performance, and reliability.

-involved in a number of accident investigations conducted by the USAF and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

  • an Air Line Pilots Association local air safety chairman, accident investigator, and national technical committee member. His safety work for ALPA led to the development of a Federal Aviation Administration advisory circular. He was instrumental in developing and implementing the Crew Resource Management course that is used by US Airways, and he has taught the course to hundreds of airline crew members.

-Working with NASA scientists, he coauthored a paper on error-inducing contexts in aviation.

-He was an air accident investigator for an NTSB inquiry into a major accident at Los Angeles International Airport, which “led to improved airline procedures and training for emergency evacuations of aircraft.”

So an A320 Captain makes a split-second decision in an emergency and it turns out great, which now makes him a leading expert in Boeing 737 engineering? Give me a break! I’ve got 10,000 plus hours in 737 NGs with a major US Airline and any of our highly trained crews would have brought both of those accident airplanes back safely. But we live in a world driven by politics!

No one can deny that Captain Sullenberger and his crew (and it was, afterall, a crew effort) did amazing work on the Hudson years ago. But that does not suddenly give him license to be an aviation safety expert in all fields, particularly as it relates to Boeing aircraft.
Captain Sullenberger, following the Colgan Air accident in Buffalo took a high profile stand with regard to pilot training and experience, which is rightfully a domain he has an expertise. But why, with that expertise, does he not advocate for what is really the cause of this accident - incompetent pilots.
As the Indonesian report clearly showed, the accident MAX aircraft was flown flown for over 90 minutes from its point of departure to its intended destination (even that is questionable airmanship) but nevertheless the aircraft was perfectly flyable once someone recognized a trim stab runaway, did the drill and turned it off. Similarly, the accident aircraft the next day was flown for 11 minutes by the Captain despite not recognizing and performing the runaway stabilizer drill and the aircraft was lost after he passed control to the first officer who had no clue how to hand fly an aircraft and use this thing called “trim”.
The Ethiopian final accident report has not been released and is overdue; I have serious doubts if it will be a legitimate report if their preliminary report is any indication however that accident reeks of pilot incompetence too, particularly since Boeing had issued an Airworthiness Directive following the Indonesian accident.
If Captain Sullenberger was really interested in furthering aviation safety, he should stick to what he knows best - training and human factors - and render an opinion that its not the beautiful, modern safe aircraft made by Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier and others are the problem but “puppy mill” pilot training schemes, poor regulatory oversight and the low-cost mentality of some of the air carriers.

This seems to be a suggestion that Boeing should only sell 737 Maxes to airlines that train to at least the standard of your major US airline employer. I’m not arguing against that - more and better training seems like a great idea. But, I don’t know that Boeing can survive just selling to a handful of US carriers. I guess it’s one business model; other people seem to be suggesting it, so maybe it’s viable. Or, I guess Boeing could sell to airlines that have put their pilots through additional training that meet some Boeing standard. I’m just a dumb old Pitts pilot who flies with almost no systems at all, and so I probably can’t think straight, but I thought that avoiding additional training was one of the reasons Boeing went down the MCAS path to begin with.
I agree we live in a world driven by politics, but in what era haven’t we?

Think about why they invented - and required - stick shakers/pushers in the first place. Pilots. Inept pilots. Ibid MCAS.

They created MCAS because of a certification REQUIREMENT for linearity of stick force vs. rate-of-change-of pitch. Period.
Dumb requirements + insipid engineering = bad airplanes.

Training definitely was a problem – in that Boeing pushed out this model as a “minor” update to the 737 in order to not have to require expensive re-training of 737 pilots. If that were done these accidents likely wouldn’t have happened. Lots of reporting on AvWeb about this, search for 737 MAX. Here’s one excerpt:

In defending Ethiopian Air and its crew, [Sullenberger] says, “I can tell you that the members of APA are offended by remarks made by those who seem to blame the pilots killed in those two crashes. Some negative aspersions have appeared in the press relating to the quality of pilots trained in Africa. I am here to tell you that I worked in Africa and trained African pilots to fly large aircraft. I am very familiar with Ethiopian Air’s pilot training program and facilities, and I can tell you that they are world-class. In fact, while not one U.S. airline has a MAX simulator, one non-U.S. airline does—Ethiopian Air. To make the claim that these accidents would not happen to U.S.-trained pilots is presumptuous and not supported by fact.”
https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/apas-daniel-carey-delivers-remarks-ahead-of-house-hearing/

Exactly right. A big part of the airline market is to airlines based in second- and third-world countries where some (and perhaps many or most) of the pilots are not trained to U.S. standards. Boeing has successfully sold planes into those markets for years, and until the Max, those planes weren’t often brought down by pilot error. That changed with the Max; it was too easy to get into a situation requiring systems knowledge, airmanship, or just steely resolve that was clearly not possessed by every crew.

My recollection is that there were multiple instances where U.S. crews ran into the same problem which took down the two foreign planes, and the crews successfully dealt with it. That’s a testament to our high training standards, but it doesn’t mean the Max is fine as-is. The plane needs to be safe in the hands of the lowest-common-denominator crew.

To my knowledge he had no input into the course that was taken to resolve the problem? My respect for him as a pilot still stands but I wish he had not come out publicly to denounce the President.

Sully should have quit while he was ahead. Triple redundancy and safety system overrides are opposite ends of the spectrum and he calls for both in the same sentence. He was very fortunate to be in an Airbus on 1549 and now to speak on what Boeing needs is too big of stretch. Neither of the accident crews even gave a thought tp pulling the power levers back which would have helped significantly if not solved their dilemmas. What they really need are PILOTS and not the 90 day wonders these third world countries are putting in the cockpit.