Originally published at: https://avweb.com/aviation-news/house-fails-to-advance-rotor-act/
Measure on ADS-B equipage falls short of two-thirds threshold.
I find this discussion unbelievable - it is 2025 right! I wouldn’t dream of flying my Cessna 150 on the central coast of California (or anywhere for that matter) without ADS-B in and out and my iPad. It is unimaginable to me why any pilot would elect to fly without being able to see traffic on a screen. I know it’s not foolproof but still a thousand times better than having no awareness but your eyeball. I can’t fathom why every GA aircraft mandated to have ADS-B out in A, B, and C airspace shouldn’t also have to have B in at the same time. Having “out” without “in” defeats the whole purpose of the system. I would go one step further and make it mandatory in Class D also.
I disagree. ADS-B in is advisory only. There is no tech available yet that can accurately project where other traffic is. Even TCAS (which is in the jet I fly) uses altitude changes to direct aircraft to avoid each other. TCAS TA’s which were in the older systems again were advisory only, not to be used to change heading on an IFR clearance without ATC clearance. I had an FO try to change heading when VFR due to a TCAS TA and ended up heading toward another plane in the new direction. I have flown planes with ADS-B in and got so many warnings I turned the system off or ignored it. When the technology and the FAR’s are changed to make ADS-B in as precise as TCAS II so that you can make course corrections ignoring ATC then I will believe ADS-B in is necessary. The FAA has not been willing to allow anything portable that is ADS-B related. Class A, B, C, and D airspace is supposed to be entered only with a ATC clearance, with ATC monitoring. The DCA accident Army helicopter should have never been allowed to be where they were. And DCA airport should have been closed after 9/11 just as the Secret Service wanted, instead of keeping open as the personal airport for Congress members. Spending thousands more for ADS-B makes no sense for a sub $50,000 plane. General aviation ( which by the way had nothing to do with the DCA accident or is even allowed to operate at DCA airport) is expensive enough, adding more equipment mandates just makes it more unreachable for those who want a career as a pilot.
An air safety instructor told me to fly at an oddball altitude. 3125, 3875, 2125, etc. Because a lot of pilots fly exactly on the 5’s. 3000, 3500, 4000, etc. I took his advice, and am here to tell about it. This does work.
I have had most success with always flying exactly 13.2 feet off the assigned altitude. Not 13.3 and definitely not 13.1. 13.2 works best. In airspace occupied by bigger airplanes I adjust accordingly.
This comment is mostly ridiculous. The commenter doesn’t understand the principles and precision of ADS-B transmissions. Sure, advisory only - but good advice.
“Last year’s January 29 midair collision at National Airport tragically took 67 lives, but it was preventable,”
This bill was a knee jerk reaction to the above.
As I understand it, the PIC of the Blackhawk had the ADS-B “on-full-force”.
No amount of ADS-B “in” would have helped.
I pretty much disagree with everything Matt W said. The only thing I do agree with is that the DCA accident was primarily a procedural and should e never happened. ADS-B In might have helped if it didn’t suffer from the same limitations as TCAS.
ADS-B is way more accurate than TCAS for everything but close proximity ranging (distance). ADS-B in its current form is advisory only, but only because the FAA has not created avionics and operational standards to support certification for conflict or collision avoidance or self separation.
Automation embedded in the ADS-B In avionics is responsible for filtering traffic information and identifying and prioritizing conflict alerts. If it’s not set correctly, it will be a major distraction.
One thing holding it (and TCAS) back, particularly in the terminal areas, is ADS-B Out intent information is limited to state vector (ground track/speed/altitude). When the standards were being developed, I advocated strongly for additional flight plan data from the FMS or GPS when available, but the FAA avionics cert office refused. They insisted that information would come from datacomm, which would require another expensive system and add another magnitude of complexity to the equation.
The only reason closing down DCA was being considered was due its proximity to the White House and Capitol. Traffic complexity and volume are manageable and no worse that many other urban airports. It’s also convenient for far more people than just politicians and provides convenience and flexibilty for anyone flying into or out of the region.
Actually ADS-B IN provides traffic alerts much sooner than TCAS does. It also displays the direction the traffic is heading as well as the vertical deviation in feet above or below your aircraft’s present altitude. If the helicopter would have had ADS-B IN capability they could have confirmed that the traffic they told ATC they had visual contact with was the same aircraft they were receiving alerts for. If the RJ had ADS-B in they would have received two TAs before their TCAS issued its TA. I don’t think those alerts would have helped the RJ pilots but they most likely would have helped the Army pilots avoid the collision.
No offense but your comments are a knee jerk reaction. Go read the NTSB report. The Army procedures for that flight were to fly with their transponder set to mode c and not mode s, and even though the crew switched to mode s as they neared DCA, their transponder wasn’t broadcasting ADS-B out data. That really didn’t matter in this case, but having ADS-B in, and using it, would most likely have prevented this accident. Check out the simulations the NTSB did showing what the Army pilots would have seen if they had a display showing ADS-B in traffic information. It’s pretty enlightening.
All the ADSB in the world won’t stop collisions.
The tower asked the chopper pilot to see and avoid traffic. The pilot looked up with night vision goggles on and the approaching craft looked stationary. However; a departing plane was passing behind the approaching aircraft. The goggles blended the lights into a single entity and the pilot thought they were clear because the departing plane had passed. Remember, your instructor told you that a stationary light is either coming at you or away. The departing lights are the only ones that were perceived as moving, so the entire group of lights were seen as clearing.
Not confirming what they were seeing, with what was on the screen, was the failure.
It is mandatory for pilots to follow TCAS RA’s even if that RA is contrary to a ATC instruction. That can’t be said with ADS-B in. ADS-B in won’t display another aircraft if that aircraft in not transmitting ADS-B out. Therefore ADS-B in, on the airliner that collided with the military helicopter that was not transmitting ADS-B out, would have been useless. ATC would not accept a pilot saying that he/she has traffic on a ADS-B display without acknowledging actually seeing that traffic visually. If ADS-B in is so great why doesn’t the FAA set up the same rules as TCAS? The FAA has not been willing to certify any portable devices for ADS-B. The Secret Service wanted to close DCA due to security reasons after 9/11. Congress couldn’t care less about having a convenient airport for you and me, they only care about convenience for themselves. And it is Congress that won’t allow the Secret Service to close DCA. I have nothing against ADS-B in, if another pilot wants it and wants to pay for it. But paying 25% or more or the value of that plane being installed makes little sense to most and will just end up driving more and more owners and pilots out of aviation.
“ • NTSB found insufficient separation between traffic on Route 4 and runway 33”
Don’t place a helicopter route in front of landing aircraft.
No ADS-B in/out, TCAS, or other system needed.
Central California or anywhere on the east or west coasts is not a representation of airspace anywhere else. It is obvious Mr. Dickins you have not flown in the interior of the US. ADS B is a political tool that needs to go away! GPS operated by the US coast guard is probably one answer. The main answer is for the military to stay in their military operation areas (MOAs) and never fly in commercial airspace classes B through E; if the military is not in commercial airspace, they will not have accidents with airliners! Dah!!! Or, fancy avionics not needed. The military just stay in MOAs! Making simple things hard unfortunately seems to be the rule of the day, these days, damm!!!
Anyone who flew prior to TCAS and ADSB-in and who flies in anything close to busy airspace knows the technology shows so much random traffic they would otherwise never be aware of. For example the central valley of California where I fly often, I was astounded at the amount of random traffic there after I got ADSB-in, and have altered course many times to avoid conflicts.
Being blunt, the notion of military aviation being confined to MOAs is not realistic. MOAs are for maneuvering type training. Your post does not consider how a military aircraft gets to and from the MOA, and does not consider military airlift operations for example which operate like civilian airline/airfreight flying.
You can’t legislate stupidity. ADS-B in would be better than having airliner landing lights in your eyes? How could the helo pilots have not seen the airliner, especially after repeated calls from DCA tower. And why schedule opposing direction flights like that at DCA-especially after many near misses.
I like ASD-B, but this mandate is off yrack.
Vince Massimini
Kentmorr Airpark, MD (3W3)
Shhh, please don’t tell the rest of the world the #1 secret to collision avoidance!!
When Congress wants to limit debate on anything or prevent changes to a proposal, red flags should go up automatically. It’s an indication that somebody is pushing something through that will benefit a few special interest parties, but be detrimental or of questionable value overall. The NTSB, as part of its investigation into the DCA midair collision, did not undertake an in-depth engineering analysis of the feasibility of integrating ADS-B technology with the multitude of airplane display and navigation technologies, both civilian and military, as is being proposed, or if a different solution may be more effective and more appropriate. The NTSB therefore has no business insisting on the implementation of this particular scheme that they proposed. The NTSB has increasingly resorted to using political means to reach beyond its technical competence, which doesn’t bode well for safety.
There seems to be a great deal of misunderstanding or ignorance about what ADS-B OUT and IN functionalities enable.
ADS-B OUT is simply the capability of an airplane to transmit its identity and certain airplane situational parameters to anyone in earshot who may care to listen. Thus the OUT capability puts an airplane “on the map,” a prerequisite for any system that aims to provide a reliable traffic awareness or collision avoidance service. It is a relatively simple technology that could use an independent GPS receiver to generate the parametric data that is transmitted and doesn’t have to involve integration with other airplane systems.
ADS-B IN is the capability to receive the OUT data from each airplane in the vicinity, i.e. “read the local traffic map,” analyze it, and display it from a point of view and the evaluated potential hazard each airplane may pose to the airplane with the IN capability. Obviously, the IN capability requires much more computing power and software complexity, as well as integration with other airplane systems such as displays and warning systems, all of which will be reflected in the cost of the IN system.
The OUT capability has to be imposed on any airplane that is flying in the airspace where traffic awareness is intended to be provided, but the IN capability is only required in those airplanes that wish to avail themselves of the traffic functions that ADS-B can provide.