Originally published at: Fuel Cutoff Switches Eyed in Air India Dreamliner Crash - AVweb
“Improper, inadvertent, or intentional actions" cannot be ruled out.
Hmm. If you’ve done everything and know you’re going in would you shut off the engines last minute, maybe closing some valves and deactivating fuel pumps?
No. If you were at altitude and an engine shut down you would follow the engine restart procedure in the manual which probably requires closing a fuel valve. When you have landed there is an engine shutdown procedure which involves turning off the fuel switches.
I’m suspecting “suicide by pilot” … one could reach behind the console and turn off the fuel which would cause a dual engine shut down, as this article surmises.
A known fact is that the FSOVs on the engines will close if the electrical system re-boots or has a momentary power-down. On top of that the electrical system will re-boot on its own, if left powered up continuously for a set period of time, whether it is on the ground or in the air.
The deployment of the RAT and the interruption of the U/C retraction, point to an electrical failure, which is unlikely to be due to crew actions.
Not necessarily. A shutdown would cause the RAT to deploy. You can’t say which came first.
Surprised (and I’m not familiar with the 787) that it wouldn’t be configured like the E190. The shutdown switches do nothing unless the power levers are at idle. This is to prevent inadvertent shutdowns
No. That is not a fact at all! Nice try with the google search though. The FSOV on each engine is actually powered by the EEC (FADEC) which is powered by a Permanent Magnetic Alternator (PMA) located on the accessory drive of the engine, completely independent from the rest of electrical system of the aircraft. The Spar valve for each engine is powered by the Main battery on the Hot Battery Bus (and thus always powered) and is commanded by the EEC to open or close. The engine cutoff switches and fire switches are connected directly to the EEC. So a complete AC electrical system failure will NOT cause both engines to shut down. And neither will a DC electrical system failure. Even if the engine is windmilling, the PMA can provide power to the EEC and the main battery will power the spar valve and engine igniters (through the standby inverter) allowing the EEC to attempt to relight the engine.
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Rushing through an emergency could lead you to turn off the wrong cutoff followed by a “whoops” and then cycle the intended engine’ cutoff, without sufficient altitude and airspeed to relight. No saying if anything remotely similar occurred here, but the scenario seems plausible.
Thanks for that. I knew that if I spouted BS I would get pukka gen thrown back at me!
By the time the plane crashed the engine fuel valves had been switched back on, 30 more seconds and they might have made it.
They wouldn’t be the first or last crew to shut off the wrong valve(s) in an engine failure, except that the plane showed no yaw and the engines both quit at once. Unlike a piston twin that needs prompt action to climb away, any jet will just keep going and the crew is trained to NOT do any clean up below 400 feet. There is no draggy windmilling prop to get feathered ASAP.
The switches are there. The labels are there.
But under pressure, are they really visible?
If two experienced pilots can miss what state these are in, maybe the question isn’t who moved them, but why it was so easy to miss what they did.
Ergonomic redesign–Maybe?
One more thing: As of June 2025, there are around 1,175 Boeing 787s flying worldwide. No reported ergonomic complaints about the throttle quadrant?
That’s either great design… or we just got lucky, until we didn’t.
Captain Steeeve has a solid take on this.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=00ooqCuRoU8
The question signs pile up. Within what time where these switches moved? Initial reporting referred to 0.1 seconds, now its a whole second. 0.1 seconds may be a bit hard, unless someone used both hands.
Can both of them be operated with one hand, given that both have to be pulled up to be moved to cutoff?
If the questions as to why (1) moving the fuel cutoff to off during a highly critical phase of flight was executable without further confirmation (because we can do the same with a rusty 172) or how (2) any electronic/ sensory function allowed the system to do it by itself (allegedly not possible) are not allowed, we have some doodoo ahead of us.
Whatever/ whoever cut that fuel, killed 260 people.
The article “Air India Report Confirms Fuel Cutoff” has been erased.
The AAIB report fortunately has not disappeared.
Parts of the CVR transcript are now being published. It reveals that one pilot (not clear which one) said to the other “why did you do that”. The reply was "I didn’t turn off the (switches? fuel? not clear). That discussion started at 180kts. I haven’t flown with many people that were truly unhinged, but it has happened, and I wonder what happened here.
I am just an old reciprocating twin-engine pilot but I highly doubt that a pilot would inadvertently change to identical (function) switches and switches that are placed side to side at the same time. The commercial jets have switch panels that make my brain hurt BUT two switches placed side by side in the central console with the same function clearly suggest a bilateral effect–both wings of the aircraft. All of the aircraft controls (pitch, roll, yaw, gear, flaps, spoilers) effectively have one input device (control column, sidestick, flaps, etc.). Engine controls are also a single input (throttles, fuel cutoff, any other possibilities). FADEC ultimately controls engine power but with 14 years of 787 commercial use predated by several years of test flying, no 787 has ever had a bilateral engine cutoff that occurred without input from the pilots. There are two switches precisely so that one engine or the other can have fuel cutoff for an emergency in the air or ground or both at the end of a flight while parked. Using my “armchair” and ill-informed logic, to me this situation suggests strongly that one of the pilots either made a terrible mistake as he/she was pre-occupied with major emotional stressors or it was done as a deliberate action. In any case, it was a terrible catastrophe and hopefully the truth of what happened will come out for the sake of the families of those on board and the reputation of the 787. Boeing does not need any new arrows coming at it. It obviously would be very helpful if a commercial jet or even business jet pilot would enlighten those of us who are just making suppositions. I certainly recognize I am NOT that person.
Appears the Boeing engineers were not thinking enough forward. Specifically the switches should be automatically disengaged when the throttles are past half way; to eliminate pilot idiocy. After the fact, it appears to be a no brainer. I wonder how many other systems require monitoring to prevent pilot error? Also a no brainer, after the fact. And how many systems does the aircraft computer(s) monitor? To prevent pilot error. Obviously, the pilots should not be alone in the cockpit, the computer(s) must be monitoring their every move! Boeing probably knows this, but is sticking with the FAA “Pilot in Command” principle. Yes, but, but, but???
Both systems are intentionally not on the same control power supply.
And I don’t know where you got the “close on reboot” info.
That basic layout has been used for all Boeings since at least the 757, 767, and 777.
It has never been an ergi9iaaue before, that I’m aware of.
Someone else asked if one could operate both switches simultaneously with one hand.
Answer? Not by any hands I’ve ever seen.
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