The FAA wasted little time following NTSB recommendations to sharply restrict helicopter operations around Reagan National Airport in Washington. In its preliminary report on a crash between an Army Blackhawk helicopter and an American Eagle CRJ last month that killed 67 people, the NTSB urged the FAA to eliminate helicopter traffic that might conflict with airliners at the busy airport. On Friday, the FAA responded by essentially closing the airspace in the immediate area of the airport to non-essential helicopter traffic and to close either Runway 15/33 or 4/22 when medical, law enforcement or presidential helicopter traffic is needed.
Finally, the FAA does something that should have been done decades ago and it only took the death of 67 people to catch their attention. This one example of incompetence beyond normal definition is just the tip of the iceberg regarding other issues in front of the FAA. The system is broken, has been broken for decades and can only be rectified through complete demolition and new construction.
Thatās what happens when an āindependentā agency such as the FAA is disallowed to be āindependentā and is forced to succumb to the whims of the D.C. establishment.
The accident revealed an oversight (bad design) that should have been addressed sooner, especially given the rise in RAs near DCA. Limited altimeter accuracy further increased the risk. Compounding the issue, Flight 5342 and PAT25 were on separate VHF frequencies, preventing the crews from hearing each otherās transmissions, a crucial gap in situational awarenessāfix this as well.
This is probably one of the most accurate statements Iāve seen. The āknee jerkā reaction. The DCA ATCT ATM should bear most of the responsibility for this.
In addition, mandatory WAAS enabled ADS-B would have prevented the altitude excursion by PAT25. They had the equipment but it was not used. Regulation change is needed.
The route altitude is not the problem. Itās using the route during runway 33 operations that is the problem. The ATM should have been proactive in that regard and bears the responsibility.
As much as I bad mouth the FAA, I donāt see them as being primarily at fault in this accident although I DO blame erroneous routing procedures (now changed) in place that shoulda been rectified long ago as being contributory. As I see it, the PAT25 crew are the primary culprits in this tragedy and the contributory factors turned it into a comedy of errors that made a perfect storm tragedy that night.
Iām not 100% sure if the helicopter was transmitting ADS-B but I think it was? (Something triggered the airlinerās TCAS and made the PAT25 route visible almost right away on Flight Aware, et al). For sure, PAT25 did not have ADS-B āinā display capability. The pilot was severely out of currency and was undergoing an eval. To boot, she was a low total time pilot, as well. Night vision goggles may have contributed. Finally, PAT25 was on UHF while the airliner was on VHF. That night the tower had airplanes taking off on runway 01 and this one landing on 33. They TOLD PAT25 about the traffic and the crew responded, āin sight.ā What else is ATC to do? PAT25 was looking at the departing 01 traffic IMHO and never looked left, perhaps due to the goggles? Had they had a display of ADS-B āin,ā theyād have seen the airliner. Further, she didnāt hold the 200ā altitude restriction.
I once flew a RAF Bulldog over the top at MCO using the UHF radios onboard. The normally super busy radio was noticeably quiet. So if the DCA tower wasnāt simulcasting, that, too, would have contributed; Iām fairly certain the tower was simulcasting? That should be an ATC action, IMHO.
One thing is for sure ā¦ āhindsightā is 20/20, sadly. Thatās why we study these accidents and try not to repeat them.
Not enough helicopter restricted airspace. No fixed wing aircraft or few except for radio practice and only during non busy times, would venture into a terminal control area where cases: B; C; D; & E airspace exist. Learning to fly and practicing is done in uncontrolled airspace below 18,000 feet MSA and in airline simulators. Everywhere. So unless the helicopters are on a commercial flight, they have no business in any terminal control area. The FAA has not gone far enough to codify the way flying lessons in particular, has occurred over the last 50 years; in uncontrolled airspace. The military has MOAs for a reason and they need to be used for everything except commercial flight in a TCA. No flying practice anywhere in a terminal control area. It is sad this needs to be codified; but appears to be a necessity. Everyone I know knows this.
Regarding multiple frequencies, Oāhare has six VHF Tower frequencies and one UHF. Yes it compromises situational awareness but is necessary to deal with high traffic levels.
Thatās a fair point regarding OāHareās multiple frequencies. While ORDās six VHF Tower frequencies, managing over 550,000 operations annually, and its single UHF channel are necessary to handle high traffic volumes, DCAās situation is different. With fewer than 300,000 operations annually, DCAās unique airspace constraints and security protocols present distinct challenges.
Unlike ORD, DCAās proximity to the Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ) and reliance on the Potomac River Visual Approach demand heightened situational awareness for all operators, especially with mixed military and civilian traffic. In this environment, a military aircraft monitoring only UHF risks missing critical updates, traffic advisories, or go-around instructions that are often relayed on VHF.
Regulatory Reference
While 14 CFR Ā§ 91.131 (Operations in Class B Airspace) does not explicitly mandate military aircraft to monitor VHF frequencies, it does require all aircraft operating in Class B airspace to establish and maintain two-way communication with ATC. In mixed civilian and military environments like DCA, where VHF is the primary frequency for civilian traffic, military crews are strongly expected, and arguably should be required, to monitor VHF to enhance situational awareness and reduce collision risk.
In short, while VHF monitoring may not yet be explicitly required for military crews using UHF, it is a crucial safety measure in congested civilian airspace, particularly in environments like DCA where compressed airspace, visual approaches, and quick ATC instructions leave little room for error. Mandating VHF monitoring for military aircraft operating near civilian traffic should be a priority for improving safety.