FAA Acting Administrator Chris Rocheleau announced that the agency will require most aircraft operating around Ronald Reagan National Airport to have ADS-B technology activated.
DCA is already within the 30NM ADS-B veil around Andrews and Dulles. So this is not a new requirement. I suppose it’s good that the Army admitted they’re not above the rules…
Also no one is required to have ADS-B IN, so will airliners actually see an accurate position on their traffic displays?
That’s what TCAS is for. TCAS is much more accurate and according to the FAR’s, it is mandatory to comply with a TCAS resolution advisory, even if it is counter to an ATC clearance, where ADS-B is advisory only, not to be used for maneuvering to avoid traffic not visually acquired or in violation of an ATC clearance.
The issue I am finding out with ADS-B, is how would a military aircraft know if it is transmitting accurate data after installation is complete. Unless ATC can see the ADS-B readout, there is no FAR mandated requirement for maintenance like the 24 month transponder check. My understanding is that ATC can delete the ADS-B display to reduce clutter on their displays. If that is happening, it defeats the entire purpose for having ADS-B in the first place.
@pilotmww, you’re right. There’s no FAR mandated ADS-B performance check like there is for transponders under §91.413, and that’s a big gap. The Black Hawk reportedly hadn’t transmitted for 730 days, and no one noticed.
If ADS-B is essential for airspace safety, we shouldn’t rely on a one time install. A biennial check, like with transponders, makes sense, especially in busy airspace.
If ATC is suppressing ADS-B returns to reduce clutter, that defeats the purpose. We need better filtering, not blind spots.
If military security is an issue, the FAA’s Limiting Aircraft Data Displayed program, LADD, already lets operators stay off public trackers.
Anyone can check if their ADS-B is working. It is very simple. After the flight just google these key words “FAA ADS-B report” the page written “Public ADS-B Performance Report Request” pops up and then just fill up the aircraft’s info. That’s it. The report in pdf format is sent to the email requester in a PDF file format showing all that is happening with the ADS-B out signal.
Also when any aircraft flying within 30NM radius from a Class Bravo airport is required to have the ADS-B OUT working. If not, when approaching limits to landing the ATC involved will tell your ADS-B is not working. It is a MUST not optional. Every time I had problems with mine when landing in CHD, ATC always called me on the radio telling me my ADS-B was out.
I saw the blackhawk’s track on adsbexchange.com about 5 min after news of the accident broke, so I don’t understand their statement that it wasn’t transmitting ADS-B out.
Were both aircraft equipped with operational TCAS? I don’t have TCAS in my airplane but I have ADS-B Out/In. There are many times that I’ve received TIS-B traffic when I couldn’t spot it visually. At the very least, it helps me know where to look for the traffic. In this case it might have helped the Blackhawk pilot correctly identify the conflicting airliner traffic. I agree that ADS-B traffic and weather dramatically improve flight safety, so it’s puzzling why there is no regulatory requirement to ensure that it is operational like the 24 month transponder requirement.
Except TCAS works well only if both aircraft are equipped. And RAs (resolution advisories) are inhibited below 1,000’ to prevent a plane being told to dive into the ground.
In this accident TCAS wouldn’t have made a difference.
That’s because ADSB Exchange, FlightAware, etc. will show airplanes that appear on radar, too. It won’t be as accurate and have all the data, but transponder-only aircraft will still show up.
The root cause is not an equipment issue, this response falls into the “feel good/do something” category…the problem is jamming too many acft thru a chokepoint, amidst a bunch of visual clutter at night, while adding NVGs that limit field of view.
ADS-B can be more distracting than useful in close-in situations because random time lags result in inaccurate geometry being presented, causing you to look for ghost traffic (your maneuvering self) or in wrong sectors because other acft has moved since data was gathered. ADS-B is good for generating (not infallible) situational awareness when 10 miles out, but can increase distraction when trying to resolve/sort ADS-B with what you can see visually. As the 60 closed in on the mishap, ADS-B might have made it even more confusing as geometry rapidly changed…and that altitude and location is not the time to be heads down.
As far as decluttering screens, that implies that conflicting and overwhelming display is diminishing display utility instead of clarifying situation, not “lazy or evil intent”…see root cause above…too much flowing thru constricted airspace.
No argument ADS-B should be functional (as a downing gripe)…unless engaged in real world ops that should also not be reported in Signal!
AFAIK, TCAS does not use any GPS derived source so ADS-B position would be far more accurate. Seems like TCAS incorporating ADS-B info might be the best solution which is what ACAS will do.
What a shame we must have 15,000 incidents and then an accident with many casualties before we take any preventive action. Why not err on the side of caution?
RAF, Improved traffic separation was the only reason, the ONLY reason why ADS-B was forced onto GA in the first place. Now I hear that in one of the most sensitive areas of the world that flights don’t need it working or even turned on?
The only “gap” here is in the logic; requiring them and then leaving them “off” when needed most.