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This may not be the result Boeing wants but it is not unusual. I have flown other planes that had operational supplements for different countries aviation authorities.
This may not be the result Boeing wants but it is not unusual. I have flown other planes that had operational supplements for different countries aviation authorities.
So, what is it going to possibly say? “Stay out of that particular corner of the air?” The MCAS is going to be the most understood and un-rightly feared system in the aircraft. The code that is causing the problem, along with the AOA system is going to be squeaky clean. I doubt there will be a pilot in the world that can even recognize the 737-type, let alone a MAX, won’t know that at the first sign of trouble, hit the trim disconnect.
I just hope the FAA is keeping score of what countries elect to “not take our word for it” on certification of the MAX. Further, I hope they return the favor when that nation wishes to certify their own ambitious design for flight in OUR precious airspace.
Without reciprocity, global aviation falls into disarray.
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Well, that is what happens when quote/unquote authority loses credibility.
Point is that any pilot that is clueless of MCAS, the physics involved, or the solution to a failure, is a bad pilot (or in Canada, a Hoser).
With the rash of accidents in Asia, maybe their maintenance and training should spark and investigation to restore “trust”?
WAY TOO MANY PEOPLE relying on a “government stamp” or “certification” to insure safety. Let’s not forget that those same agencies certified it in the first place. They may have been wrong then–are they wrong NOW?
The airlines–and the FAA–wanted all 737s to fly alike, so they could use mixed fleets and pilot certification. That meant artificial feel to make it fly like the older models–and Boeing complied.
There’s nothing unique about “differences training” on many jets. Look at the first DC-9s–short airplane, no high-lift devices–a completely different airplane than the later DC-9s and Dash-80s–yet successfully operated by flight crews around the world with simple differences training.
I don’t know a single 737 pilot that would refuse to fly the aircraft. Any (I guess I should insert the word “COMPETENT”) jet pilot knows better than to fight trim. Every jet pilot knows where the trim cutoff switch is. MAX aircraft have been ferried all over since the accidents–not one of them has fallen out of the sky.
In Canada, they still have a big “mad-on” for Boeing on the Bombardier 220 fiasco. Look at Canadian Skies online magazine–they bash Boeing every chance they get. I’m fairly certain that the “we will accept the airplane, but put our unique conditions on it” is part of the issue. What trim conditions are unique to Canada? I live close to the Canadian border–and haven’t noticed that the air is any different up there than here in Minnesota.
>>we should step back and ponder why other countries may not want to “take our word for it” any longer
Fair enough. Let’s take a look at which countries are having trouble accepting FAA approval. Hmmm, EASA, which regulates Airbus. Canada (Bombardier). China (State-owned aircraft manufacturers). Brazil (Embraer).
Yes, it couldn’t possibly be political or competitive. Must be their doubt over good technical safety problems that elude the FAA.
Nevermind that a joint board is participating in the recertification effort, and the FAA is accepting questions/comments/concerns from any world regulator as part of that process.
EASA wants Boeing to find a place on the airplane to mount a third AOA vane. Let’s see, there’s left and there’s right. Where are we going to put AOA sensor #3?