FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker is being called on the carpet to explain the FAA's role in the Boeing 737 MAX door plug blowout last January. Whitaker will appear before an investigative subcommittee of the Senate Transportation and Infrastructure Committee on Sept. 25. to discuss the FAA's oversight of Boeing as a new MAX 9 went through Boeing's Renton assembly plant and was delivered without four bolts that secured the door plug. On Jan. 5, the door plug detached while the plane was climbing out of Portland on an Alaska Airlines flight to California.
Hi, LarryS. Thanks for the epithets. Any suggestions to help improve the situation?
Friedman would probably advocate for the system that was in place at Boeing - let the manufacturer largely self-regulate, and let the market decide whether their product is safe enough to consume. That may work (in theory) for hair driers or electric shavers, but when the test of the effectiveness of the companyâs QA is an aluminum tube holding 200 precious souls at 39,000 ft, I would prefer a review from a set of eyes that answers to the public, not the company.
Thank you Jon for calling out the epithets - a favorite currency of the old comment section but hopefully not the new one.
Youâre spot on with âwhen the test of the effectiveness of the companyâs QA is an aluminum tube holding 200 precious souls at 39,000 ft, I would prefer a review from a set of eyes that answers to the public, not the company.â I would add, âespecially this particular company at this particular time in its existence.â
This was my first reaction to this story. Where were the FAA inspectors? Who left those bolts out and was there some motive to do so? It is certainly not unheard of where union employes do stupid things when negotiation time comes around. It was floor workers who left these out. A fact that seems to be overlooked. When will the bureaucrats call those involved to answer questions? The constant clamoring over cultural issues should not excuse those assigned a simple task of properly installing four bolts.
I recommend you read past issues of AvWeb to learn of results of various hearings by NTSB and US Congress, including NTSB grilling cognizant floor workers and managers and record keepers.
A Problem is people depending too much on regulation when choosing a supplier, not enough thinking for themselves.
And trade restrictions - read of action by US persons against Bombardierâs C-Series.
(Which backfired on whiner Boeing, product is now the A220 and selling as fast as they can be produced - a better airliner than Boeingâs Max7.)
Note all major airplane manufacturers are propped up by taxpayer money, especially Airbus and Bombardier - Boeing and Embraer less directly.
Pardon my misuse of the term âepithetâ. I only got a B in freshman English - though I might argue that âbureaucratâ is an epithet.
Whatever the case, Boeing was given the authority to oversee its own engineering and safety program. They were accountable only to themselves. Maybe one of AvWebâs writers can expound on the origins of the designated authority program, but whatever the case, Boeing appears to have abused it to the publicâs detriment.
Iâm shocked (shocked!) that anyone is surprised by this totally predictable step in this story-arc. In any complex system involving humans, there will be failure points with vanishingly small probability that cannot (and arguably should not) be addressed. The hope is that, with proper training and inspection mechanisms in place, issues will be identified and rectified before they rise to the level of flight safety. Iâm fairly confident that a MAX9 could not lift off if the seats were removed and its only cargo was the paperwork that was necessary for its production. The best processes and procedures âgang aft agleyâ when implemented by humans.
By all accounts, this was the result of an anomalous circumstance for which no inspection procedure was in place, or could have been anticipated, coupled with lower management issues, none of which were the direct result of FAA oversight, nor could be reasonably placed at the feet of a federal agency.
This hearing is nothing more than political âcounting coupâ which will do nothing to prevent such an event from occurring again in such a Godelian âsufficiently complex systemâ.
I think Iâve read about all there is to read about this topic. In this country there is an anti-corporate mentality. And most of that is generated by the left-wing politicians who constantly use it for their benefit. They simply love to divide. Those politicians with good intentions likely have no idea what questions should be asked and if they did, they certainly would not jeopardize a single vote and ask it. And for that matter, it is doubtful the FAA does either. The simple fact remains that even with the worst possible âcultural issuesâ, those very well-paid workers were asked to do a very simple but very important task, and they botched it. I can guarantee you that should a licensed mechanic do the same on any other aircraft, there would be punishment involved. I would at least like to hear how these persons were reprimanded if at all. And it is these very same types that have now shut down Boeing making demands that are every bit as greedy as any management. Nothing like kicking your dog when itâs down.
The only problem with the A220 is nobody including Airbus have yet to make a buck off it yet. And it seems the PW engine issues are creeping into it also. At last report, approx. 20% of them are grounded. On a recent trip I flew in both the A220 and the Max. Twice. I really donât see what all these positive posts of the A220 are about. Itâs just another cramped, noisy commuter type. Iâll take the Max any day. Assuming I ever had a choice. Apparently the number one thing about the A220 is that it doesnât have the Boeing label on it. I can only wonder what if Boeing had bought it what your (and so many others) opinion of it would then be?
When I taught A&P courses many years ago, on the very first night â before formal classroom work started â I made an hour long talk about âbeing an airplane mechanic and what that means.â Among the points ⌠the purpose of discipline. By being disciplined (not punished), a person develops self-discipline no longer needing the long arm of someone else to ensure proper conduct when no one was looking over your shoulder. Itâs easy to take the easy road; not so easy to do things right. THAT was my point. Basic military training serves the same function.
With my âepithets,â my point was that Boeing was responsible to do the work properly in the first place, has QA functions to make sure anyways and Government rep responsibility on top of that not to mention union complicity. ALL failed. Why? Too much bureaucracy and not enough self-discipline.
As far as the FAA Bureaucracy, same story, different flavor. The FAA can lead people to water but canât make 'em drink. So the Administrator comes tap dancing in front of Congress with some great stories because THEY didnât enforce things properly either.
So how do you fix all of this. SImplify and enforce self-discipline. The constant push for âproductivityâ vs. quality is part of the problem. Ultimately, a line worker didnât do his/her job and thereâs a reason for that?
Thanks for expanding on your thoughts, LarryS. The problem with self-discipline as a solution is that people are a) fallible, b) selfish and c) lazy (not all people, of course). QA is a best practice specifically for that reason. The question is, who is responsible for QA - a regulator whose first duty is the public, or a company employee whose first duty is to the shareholders? Weâve seen from the Boeing example that there appears to be little penalty for actually putting out a dangerous product under the current system. Dennis Muilenberg is still a free, wealthy man, and the people in Ethiopia and Indonesia are still dead.
This situation goes a lot further back than just the FAA. It was Congress years before the 737 Max was certified who pressured the FAA to speed up approvals for more FAA designated manufacturers representatives. Unfortunately the current administrator was not in office when all that occurred. Maybe that committee should go over past committee records to see if the past committee chairpersons should share in some of the responsibility.
I find this situation baffling, but I donât hold the FAA directly responsible. While the FAA is accountable for ensuring proper oversight of aircraft, it isnât expected to inspect every detail, like the attachment of four bolts. Its role is to ensure manufacturers like Boeing have effective systems in place to catch such issues. If those systems fail, the FAA is responsible for inadequate oversight, not for missing specific details. However, the potential for catastrophic outcomes from sloppy practices is a serious concern that demands attention.
Should the FAA hire more inspectors and increase oversight, or are the current rules sufficient, with the focus needing to shift toward better enforcement and smarter, data-driven inspectionsâand at what cost burdens would these changes come?
And what set of eyes would you suggest? What would this new agency in charge of aircraft safety be called? The FASA?
As Friedman would point out, we already have an agency that answers to the public in charge of aircraft safety. We have volumes of FARS, CFRS and other regulations and laws on the books. Those regulations were ignored and/or at least massaged to get around key aspects of those regulations.
Perhaps a dozen or so new regulations and a new agency, with a the caveat *Hey, we really, really mean it this time?
The market will always speak first and the loudest: I will never fly Boeing again.