Thanks for posting. I look at my aviation life as a journey. In 2010 a guy with 20k+ hours augered his plane in. I looked up to this god and when he died I quit for about a year.
I went to an AZ flight training school and within 4 months we had five fatalities in that time. The first ever for that school which had two campuses in the US at that time. I almost quit then.
I’d been flying since until about a year ago when I started reading all the Kathryn’s and Blancolirio stuff and some AvWeb. The one accident that really had me wigged out is the one recently where a guy came screaming in and mowed over a student and instructor who were doing everything right in the pattern. No radio calls just a straight in at a ridiculous speed. No matter how careful those pilots were it didn’t matter…Constantly seeing these accident reports has kept me out of it temporarily. But renewing my FIRC this month rekindled it.
I listen to McSpaddens podcast and I see them as valuable: the tagline is something akin to “learning how pilots flew out of those situations”. That is both positive and empowering. He does a great job of breaking it down and you always learn something new. Or something gets reinforced. For example just declare an emergency already if you need any sort of help. And partial power is not necessarily a good thing.
I would say that to make any decision re flying you just need to admit that there is risk and reward with it. You decide if the trade off is worth it for you.
If the goal is to stave off complacency and learn something new, I find the NASA ASRS “Callback” newsletter far more useful for than than reading a random GA accident report. We all know about the NASA ASRS system for reporting non-accidents as a “get out of jail free” card, but I find very few of us actually take advantage of the flip side of it by reading the actual reports pilots submit, which is what “Callback” does.
So I say in general, forget the accident reports and go to the ASRS reports instead.
I was commenting to my non-pilot wife about this article and it reminded her of the effect of missing children photos on milk cartons. They were good in raising awareness but had the unintended consequence of freaking parents out into thinking their child was at a very high risk of being kidnapped in spite of the very low probability of such occurrence. This is very similar.
The Opposing Bases podcast, hosted by two controllers who are also pilots, just addressed this in episode 250. If you appreciate the humor of the Short Final column, you’ll probably like their show.
Years ago flight following was telling me of an unknown aircraft at my 3:00 position and closing. He was quite rieled up and concerned. I looked over, and it was a flock of birds in a V configuration. They must have shown up as a plane on his radar screen. I calmly said that I had visual contact, and would change course accordingly. )
I second John M’s recommendation to listen to that OB episode 250 podcast on just this topic. The hosts, full time air traffic controllers, advise using navigation aides such as VORs or airports as waypoints to define your route. They have definite preferences and tips for such a route. Too much to recite here. Skip to 34:55 of the podcast to hear this topic.
My strategy with ATC is to keep it brief and let them tell me things or ask questions. With practice you will know what they want in different situations, but I start off with:
Me: XXX Approach, NYYY, request. [To get their attention]
App: NYYY, say request.
Me: NYYY is a Cessna something, departed/over location/landmark/fix. [Tell them where you are so they know you are on the right frequency/sector] Request flight following. Making a circle around the Class C. [Briefly say your intentions.]
App: [Here’s where they will elaborate, and hopefully say squawk ZZZZ.]
In general, ATC is your friend. If you can do it, instrument training makes this second nature.
Einstein said that “Doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results” is the definition of insanity.
IF, indeed, the “looky-loos” that dote upon the schadenfreude of reading about the accidents of others REALLY turned into the “learning experience” they profess to experience, there would BE A LARGE DECLINE in the number of accidents.
Despite claims to the contrary, the reality is that pilots keep making the same old mistakes over and over–Dating all the way back to September 17, 1908–when Orville Wright crashed and killed Lt. Selfridge in the first fatal airplane crash.
Aircraft have been crashing for all this time–and most of the causes have been repeated time and time again. So much for the “learning experience.”
Engine out on takeoff. Both single engine and twin engine pilots would benefit.
Rejected takeoff. Avoiding #1 by prevention.
In Flight Loss of Vacuum. Loss of AHRS in flight.
Flight into IMC conditions. I think I’ve only been trained in this procedure once.
Speed awareness. Icing.
These are but a few. The FAA has an AQP training program for commercial pilots but this type of training for GA is largely ignored.
I think that’s a good list. I know the simulators most GA pilots would be able to afford would have no motion simulation whatsoever, but I firmly believe there’s a lot of value in using those sims to practice the things that are just too risky/stupid to do “for real”, especially if we can get good visuals that allow the “suspension of disbelief”.
We tell pilots all the time to “fly the airplane all the way to the ground” in a forced landing–but how many of us truly practice engine-out landings? How many of us really cut the power at 300ft on takeoff and land the airplane from there? I’m not talking putting the engine to idle in the vicinity of an airport and landing on the runway, or making a practice approach to some field and aborting at a couple hundred AGL. I mean, kill the engine and actually land in that random farmer’s field without stalling, while the whole time the monkey brain is screaming “pull up so you don’t hit the ground!!” We TELL people to do one thing in an emergency, but we never really truly DO those last critical bits of those emergency procedures (except in a real emergency!), and we reinforce over and over and over again “land smooth on the runway” with hundreds of regular landings.
Simulators have a good bit of value in “regular” instruction, too, for teaching certain concepts and procedures far more cheaply than burning gas and airframe time to do them, even if they never never count “for credit”.
Yep, similar mindset. A bit over 25,000 hours, 425 carrier landings, a love of the freedom while flying light aircraft, and I’ve had enough. The risk and expense and the hassle aren’t worth it anymore. I’ve put enormous effort into doing it right, have never gotten a “down” in military training, never failed a checkride or line check, and it’s time to quit while I can look back at a satisfying career without regret.
There really isn’t anything “new” that I’m going to experience or see in the air in my remaining lifetime. I am enjoying lovely endeavors where I am not bothered, there are few accidents, and the return on investment is far greater.
Of course, there is no evidence that Einstein said that oft misattributed quote, but it is a symptom that is still prevalent in flying. Pilots often rely on bad information, passed down from person to person without much investigation on the efficacy of a procedure or practice.
Good list, but I’d classify go-arounds and rejected takeoffs as maneuvers. And if you stay out of the clouds, icing is not an issue.
Re: the other scenarios, you are right, they SHOULD be covered by your instructor/s. If not, remember YOU are in charge of your training; if you aren’t getting what you needs (and it sounds like you know enough to “know what you don’t know”), it’s up to you request the training (or change instructors.)
The scenarios I was referring to that we practice in the 777 simulator are multi-faceted, complex scenarios with multiple possible outcomes and depend on good CRM. For instance, the engine anti-ice valve on the left engine is failed. You are at cruise above the clouds and now the center hydraulic system fails. There is a short (but legal) runway below you, but you have to descend thru the ice to get there, or fly further away to a longer runway in VMC with just the two remaining hydraulic systems, but the crosswinds are at the limit (38 knots) and fuel will be an issue…
The race of some to self ingratiate themselves with “early analysis” is fraught with misinformation that can be damaging at all levels. This week’s King Air accident at KPKB is no exception. The you-tube video I saw was pure garbage. Garbage! It would be better for these people post something factual and helpful after the investigation is complete. AOPA has produced many after-the fact videos, with facts, that are very helpful training tools.
We continue to make the same mistakes in aircraft. The common link to these mistakes is human factors. What would be most helpful, and is missing from all final reports, is a professional analysis of why a given pilot made a bad decision or a series of bad decisions. For example why did the pilot of a King Air decide to fly, and continue to fly, an un-stabilized instrument approach at KPKB. All of us have been there. None of us are exempt from making a bad decision. Avoiding bad decisions is the key to safer flying…and hence the key to less self promoting you tube videos.
The FAA has a person with a PHD in aircraft accident human factors. I have listened to her talk and she is fascinating. For accident prevention this is what we need to be listening to, not some know-nothing you tube video.
