After reading all of the comments that were posted after I made mine, I feel compelled to add the following:
- Ad hominem attacks on Capt. Sullenberger are fallacious and irrelevant. They are also rather childish.
- Pilot error is all too common. So is using pilots as scapegoats, to evade responsibility for faulty design.
- Boeing has a long and unenviable record of cutting corners, sacrificing safety to expediency and profit,
and of “wining and dining” Congress to curry favor, gain lucrative contracts, and escape penalties for
failure to comply with federal aviation regulations. I cited the literature on this topic earlier. Thus
there is prima-facie reason to suspect Boeing of doing more of the same, which in fact they did with
regard to the 737-MAX, in at least a dozen ways. Further details are in my essay, also cited above. - The chief causes of pilot error are (a) fatigue (b) distraction. Fatigue did not play a role in either of
the fatal crashes that occured in 2018, Distraction did. Even the most competent, experienced,
and level-headed pilots are susceptible to that. In both cases (Lion Air, Ethiopian Airways), not just
the pilot but the entire crew was distracted (and upset) by a series of flashing lights that were both
startling and wholly unexpected. The more they reacted to these “false alarms,” the more that they
inadvertently created the actual conditions that made them stall, then spin out of control, and crash.
That was not their fault. It was Boeing’s fault, for not telling them that the computer systems were
federated, not integrated, and for not giving them any prior warning, let alone a (new) manual for
the aircraft, to prepare them for that. They received no training, either on the ground or in the air,
and thus were left in the dark, in ignorance that was far from blissful, when the moment of truth
confronted them. Puzzled by the mystery, they acted on assumptions that were false and thus
proved fatal. Their actions were entirely reasonable; they were flying blind, as it were, and the
passengers and crew on both flights paid the ultimate price for what can only be described as
criminal negligence by the Boeing corporation, its subsidiaries and subcontractors, and its high-
level executives. That is all there is to it–that and the ongoing corruption in the entire industry. - One further point. If Boeing fixed everything properly, there would be no need for a device to
override or turn off the stick shaker. That much is true. But since (as Sullenberger observed)
they aren’t about to do that, but will in all likelihood release planes for commercial use in the
near future that are only partially rather than completely airworthy, pilots will have to cope
with a succession of “minor” flaws and defects, of which that annoying stick shaker is one.
Sully’s point is that it’s better to have one less distraction in the cockpit, so that the crew
can concentrate on everything else they have to do, and do quickly, especially in case of
an emergency. There is nothing illogical about that. Rather, it is Boeing that persists,
both in begging the question and in refusing to do anything more than patch work, while
risking the lives of everyone on board for the sake of cutting their losses (sic), satisfying
their shareholders, and engaging in big business as usual–callous, indifferent, obscene.
To put it bluntly, you can’t expect pilots to compensate for a “half-assed” repair job by
performing miracles, be it on the Hudson, the Nile, the Amazon, or the Mississippi river.
Yet that is exactly what Boeing is doing–and, with the complicity of the government,
they will get away with it, and laugh all the way to the federal bank to collect their
insurance for “acts of God” that were written off as unforeseen and unpreventable.
When (alas) it happens again, ask not for whom Boeing tolls. Surely not for thee.