It seems to me Sully is making a case for proper training, combined with improved design and integration of existing technology (purposefully left out by Boeing) to take into account excellent US airline performance and “puppy mill” training that seems more and more prevalent both in the US and overseas carriers. MAX was supposed to meet certain design certification criteria for aircraft stick loads and make the case for no additional transition training to MAX from 737 rated pilots at the same time. Boeing was so confident of MCAS, they didn’t even bother to tell the purchasing airlines it was aboard…until one crashed.
Sully has a boatload of safety/advocacy/training/CRM/NTSB investigator credentials in addition to being a glider pilot. He and Skiles validated excellent CRM skills, understanding and execution of procedures, proper evaluation of systems under great stress, and then performed…not in theory…a dead stick landing of that Airbus on the Hudson.
He is quite qualified to critique MCAS from design, engineering, training, and implementation. The airline industry would not be using the full potential of CRM they advocate in the cockpit ignoring his suggestions about MCAS, proper training, and best practices for safe integration as these airplanes return to the skies. C
He and Skiles cannot walk on water but has demonstrated they can land on it well enough for the airplane to float for evacuation and eventually be recovered. He walks his talk. And he has done that his entire flying career, just as many Avweb professional pilot commentators. Dismissing that experience would be a terrible thing to waste, considering Boeing’s penchant for cost cutting.