The entire charter/“holding out” concept DOES need to be defined–and improved. The FAA has killed the charter market with draconian rules and inspections.
It used to be that most small airports had an operator that did flight instruction–some maintenance–aircraft rental–and a “for hire” aircraft ride or “charter.” Most flight rules continued under Part 91.
An individual or business might consider buying a Bonanza-like airplane–though he could afford something with more weather capability, he didn’t have the use for it by himself, and perhaps couldn’t devote the time to maintain proficiency. The local FBO would put together a group of other businesses that wanted access to a capable aircraft, and the aircraft was purchased. The owner AND the FBO were happy, and other companies in town had access to a corporate aircraft–many times, buying their OWN. It was good for the aircraft owners–the FBO, and the people in town.
The FAA came up with “Part 135”–initially, it wasn’t bad–a little better-defined maintenance, and pilot checkrides. The advent of the corporate jet raised the ante–more and better training was obviously needed, and the FAA wrote the law accordingly. Unfortunately, they applied the law to the REST of the fleet as well–even to small aircraft. The business aircraft fleet became stagnant–until the “work-arounds” started. The NBAA was able to negotiate exemptions for members–“time sharing” and “interchange”–as well as aircraft leases. Companies like Executive Jet Aviation provided “aircraft management services”–freeing business owners from having to comply with complex FAA regulation. EJA went even one better–selling “partial shares” of as little as 1/16 of an aircraft–and eventually even “jet cards” that allowed non-owners to buy a block of time, without the limitations of Part 135.
The high cost of regulation killed the “leaseback” concept. CONSIDER–the professionally-flown aircraft rivaled the airlines for aviation safety–even without the excessive regulation of the charter operators. The charter operators were flying the VERY SAME AIRCRAFT as the corporate operators–yet had an accident rate many times higher than corporate–due to the economics of complying with FAA regulation–THE FAA MADE SAFETY WORSE WITH CHARTER REGULATION. The draconian regulation cascaded down the line–the turboprop, cabin and light twin, and single-engine operators were unable to get the regulatory relief–and “leasing to a charter operator” fell out of favor–businessmen went back to single-engine aircraft. Only the high-end charter market remained.
The FAA not only killed the charter market, but killed the light-twin market as well–even affecting the turboprop market. As one of the owners of a King Air told me when he sold his airplane–“It’s a hell of a note that I HAVE A PAID-FOR AIRPLANE–I have friends that would gladly pay to use it–but I can’t because the government has so many rules for it that don’t even apply if we flew it ourselves.”
I ask you–how in the world is business supposed to see the value of business aircraft if you have to whistle up a jet from far away–and it costs this kind of money? Would you own a CAR, if you had to have the driver tested twice a year–have special maintenance done to the car that didn’t apply if you didn’t rent it out–if you had limitations on the hours you could drive the car every day–if you had limitations on weather that didn’t apply to private car owners? We get inquiries about charter often at the airport I manage–the callers are often incredulous that the service isn’t offered here–that the aircraft has to come some distance to initiate the trip–and the “ballpark” costs I estimate for them. FAA CHARTER REGULATIONS ARE THE LARGEST SINGLE ITEM IN THE DECLINE OF THE GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY.