good analysis. I would hate to be Harrison Ford and have my mistakes be scrutinized by everyone.
Well, he’s 77 years old , a history years of drug use, and serious head injuries from a crash not that long ago, I can have the opinion that it’s taken it’s toll. He has noticeable sured speech and is making basic mistakes. Sometimes it’s time to hang up the spurs…
Roger here again. Not trying to be a “know it all”. However, I soloed out of Torrance in '59 and continued to fly actively out of all the L.A. basin airports until '76 when I left the area. From '68 until leaving the area, I worked as an ATC type out there including at Long Beach, both Tracon (when there was such a thing) and in the control tower also. This was the era of VA flight training. LGB was at the time the 4th busiest airport in the country with at times as many as 22 flight schools operating off the airport, 560K operations a year. My point is these “who cares” events occured all the time by both pilots and controllers. Had we “told on” each other every time, the region would have had to hire another dozen persons just to process our paperwork. Pilots and controllers quickly forgive each other for these minor indiscretions and would then resume the very busy business of making it work. I loved it! How this issue with Harrison ended up seeing the light of day, I don’t know…but never should have had the spirit still existed. I guess it takes “busy” to keep you so involved that you don’t have time for petty. (I did later end up at ORD for many delightful years of “busy” where there was just no time for petty.) …not sure what I just said…
Good wisdom here. I had my initial IFR checkride cut short over controller-pilot communications somewhere in the last century. In my case, I was doing fine and nearly completed the checkride with 2 approaches left to demonstrate. The DPE told me to call Center for a clearance due to a layer of CBs in the way of the ILS. Center told me the field was VFR call the Tower. Tower told me to call Center. Center was miffed and gave me a clearance but with a different IAF than the published JEPP fix. I read back the clearance properly and proceeded as cleared. As we were passing the Locator (the published IAF) for the on field VOR, the DPE blew a gasket, ripped the plate out of the holder and pointed out the NDB/locator fix and asked me in blunt terms what are you doing??? What was a poor low time pilot to do? I pointed out to the examiner that I was filing as cleared…nope…he just got hotter. I pointed out I knew I had read back “cleared to the vor then left turn fly the full procedure outbound.” He just got more excited, so, I continued and asked the poor controller to repeat my clearance. He did, at student pilot speed. I read back at student pilot speed. The DPE never said a word as I continued to fly the procedure as cleared. We were switched to tower at procedure turn inbound and cleared for low approach. DPE said, no, tell him you’re landing. Busted, I thought. We landed and taxied in. I was escorted into the office and got the richest lecture on cockpit complacency I ever heard. He asked if I had any questions? Just one. When can I re-take the checkride. He told me that anyone who could remain calm on a checkride with a lunatic who didn’t listen to the controllers raving in the right seat could pass any checkride and handed me my ticket. His final words to me: Even a 20,000 hour DPE can and does miss a communication, and the willingness of a pilot who might not have it right and ask the question might save someone’s life. I went on to take a number of additional checkrides with him until he finally retired.
Thank you Roger A for your thoughtful, experienced, and very educational response. We are told as pilots to listen and then anticipate ATC responses based on that exchange of communications including those communication being given to other pilots. I, too, have listened several times to this exchange. It was chopped by the mike control of the tower controller, combined with the word continue. Many of us would have done the same thing.
The only difference I am not Harrison Ford. Had it been me, a non-event, with maybe a call to the tower. But with Harrison Ford, its viral YouTube video material. This situation appears to me to be nothing more than someone trying to capitalize on Harrison Ford’s fame.
am I miss hearing this or does he repeat the “hold short” instruction ? then proceed to cross the active ?
Listen to the recording with readback from pilot TWICE and then see if “bad decision” or something else.
Surely you jest. Hanging that over a CFI’s head? Do you want a 10 hour review covering absolutely everything? Come on…
Following his second read back, the controller (at about 1:30) repeated his instruction - Ford apparently heard that instruction wrong and proceeded across the runway.
Mark F?
From the pilot-controller glossary: “CONTINUE− When used as a control instruction should be followed by another word or words clarifying what is expected of the pilot. Example: “continue taxi,” “continue descent,” “continue inbound,” etc.”
What the controller did was to acknowledge Ford’s transmission that he was holding short at Hotel. Instead of saying “Roger”, the controller repeated his instruction to hold short, using “continue” (an approved term in this context) to preface the instruction. “Continue” sounds a lot different that “cross.”
Note also that he gave an advisory, stating “traffic on the runway,” which told Ford why he was having to continue holding short.
As for any delay in correcting Ford…the controller immediately told him to “get across the runway”, instead of telling him to stop. Evidently the controller felt that Ford could get across the runway in time to avoid the inbound aircraft.
So…Ford was told to “hold short” and there was “traffic on the runway.” Those two verbal cues should have been more than enough to tell Ford that he wasn’t authorized to cross the runway.
“I thought exactly the opposite, I’m terribly sorry.” He didn’t say “heard”, he said “thought.” It’ll be interesting to see what FAA says when they finish investigating this, but I’d hazard an opinion that this is a case of “assumption bias.” Was Ford expecting the next instruction to be “cross 25”? How many times (in life and not just in aviation) have we “heard” what we were expecting to hear instead of what was actually said?
Finally, in response to the comments that this was a non-event and should not have seen the light of day…the controller had no choice but to report it. There’s good reason for it - the order re: MORs (JO 7210.632, look it up) states that runway incursions and surface incidents are two of the reasons that MORs have to be submitted. How else is FAA going to gather and analyze data regarding runway incursions and take action to help prevent them? From the sound of it, this will be a Class D incursion - “Category D is an incident that meets the definition of runway incursion such as incorrect presence of a single vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft but with no immediate safety consequences.” “No harm, no foul”, but it’s a safety hazard nonetheless and needs to be analyzed and addressed.
It’ll be interesting to see what the FSDO does about this. On one hand, it’s the lowest incursion classification. On the other, it’s twice in three years for him. Again, I don’t see that the controller did anything wrong. IMHO, Ford didn’t “mishear” the instruction, he made an assumption and acted on it. Unfortunately, he assumed wrong.
Agree!
There were a lot of comments about the article regarding Cirrus’ plan to collect data on aircraft performance and, as a side benefit, the airmanship of the pilots, ostensibly to provide constructive feedback. Some commenters felt that this was an overreach. I would have to agree. You can see how even minor issues can get blown way out of proportion once data gets out of your control. This microscopic scrutiny of who is arguably one of GA’s most famous pilots shows how even small errors can be magnified into earth-shattering events if it’s a slow news day, or a particular media outlet has an agenda to push.
This also points out the asymmetry of the scrutiny of events that occur in aviation. Scores of people die every day in auto traffic accidents with the only media response being to write about the effect on the traffic. One famous guy makes an error that any one of us could have made (and probably did) and it’s splashed all over the world.
#Leave_Harry_Alone.
Respectfully disagree that runway incursions are a “minor issue” or a “small error.” Crossing a runway without permission is a MAJOR error, no matter who or what was responsible for it. Earth-shattering this time? No. Other times, yes. Regardless of the impact, incursions need to be investigated and the cause dealt with. Ignore this as a “minor issue” once? Let the same person or causal factor contribute to another incursion, this time with damage and fatalities, and then see what happens when it comes out that it could have been prevented.
I’ll add one thing to this: “Position and hold” was once a valid phrase, that was changed to “line up and wait”, because (mostly foreign) pilots misinterpreted it to be “position and roll”.
I have had controllers tell me to “continue” [doing nothing] (“continue holding”, etc), and other times to “continue” [doing something] (“continue inbound”, etc), both of them “approved” phraseology. And I have also at times misinterpreted what they meant (or was uncertain what they meant and asked for clarification) around the use of “continue”. In my opinion, you should never be told to “continue” a negative (like holding short, which is a “negative”: that is, holding short is essentially not doing anything). Maybe a phraseology change to “remain holding”, etc would be better, leaving “continue” for positives (flying inbound, crossing a runway, etc).
My point being, the phraseology book has changed, and it will continue to change in the future.
In the discussion about phraseology, there’s another clue that tells me that Ford fell victim to “assumption bias.” He didn’t read back what the controller said, “Continue holding short…” Ford said “Cross…” Big difference between the two words. He read back what he THOUGHT the controller was going to say. It’s not an issue about phraseology, it’s about his mindset that the next instruction he received would be to cross the runway.
I had an airfield driving trainee do pretty much the same thing to me, and it almost caused a runway incursion. I was evaluating him to drive on a major airport while communicating with ATC on a complex large-hub airport (four parallel runways, two crosswinds, about a dozen parallels, and dozens more connectors). The controller instructed him to drive on a parallel taxiway up to and to hold short of a taxiway where he would have to turn right to cross a runway that was along the route he was taking to his destination. He read the instruction back correctly and stopped where instructed.
In the meantime, the airport fire department had just completed a response drill. The command vehicle was returning to the fire station and called ground to cross the same runway that we were supposed to cross, at a different taxiway (out of our view) than what we were holding short of. The controller responded, “Fire **, cross Runway **.”
My trainee heard the instruction intended for Fire ** and responded “Ops ** crossing Runway **.” Two things happened: I grabbed the steering wheel and yelled “STOP!” and the controller yelled “Ops **, STOP.”
I had him return us to the classroom (he was pretty shaken up) and we debriefed. He admitted that he was ‘leaning forward in the straps,’ expecting to be told to cross the runway, and heard “Runway **” and THOUGHT he heard “Ops **.”
I’ve even had driving trainees do a readback correctly and then drive the route that they THOUGHT they were going to be given (the complexity of the field means that there could be as many as five or six different routes a vehicle operator or pilot could be given to get from one point to another).
I don’t hear any clues that tell me the controller’s phraseology was improper - Ford was given a clear, simple instruction, and he fell victim to his preconceived notion that his next instruction was going to be to cross the runway.
AIM 4−3−20. Exiting the Runway After Landing The following procedures must be followed after landing and reaching taxi speed.
a. … At airports with an operating control tower, pilots should not stop or reverse course on the runway without first obtaining ATC approval.
On this video it is noted that Harrison was increasing power as he was repeating what he thought were the controller’s instructions. If that is what happened, that apparently eliminated any chance for the controller to hear a bad readback. Just short of the holding line, I wouldn’t move an inch until I’ve given the controller a chance to catch a bad readback - wouldn’t take but a couple of seconds.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nU0BmAWtz5c&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR1urNgcg2fIBYrla-OqaHOzE1nSLxMHO2nYz6ekO2hfjZebcUvhIaRWJOs
As I sit watching this video, it was like flying along with these two nit-wits.
People wonder how, and why airplanes crash ?
Well, when you have goofballs like these sitting in the cockpit-- it is any wonder.
They were “UNSTABLE” from the get go!
and the really sad thing is neither one of them realized it. They just kept that bad approach going on. I can’t help but wonder what kind of Airline they work (fly) for? Training? Standards?
Well, the important thing is, they had their masks on. There are priorities you know…