Collings Crash And Safety Culture - AVweb

News Discussion
21

Having flown warbirds for different operations and observed Collings Foundations ops many times, I found them in the comfort zone. To have so many casual, unengaged observers make claims to their ops, maintenance and budget based on nothing but the FAA’s regurgitation of the NTSB’s reports and one interview is not particularly enlightening to the operation as a whole .

The Fed response is typical of them especially in regard to Collings politically, ie they have a lot of fans and a lot of detractors within the Fed. Because of their desire to restore and operate jets like the F-4 and Me-262 as well the high number of aircraft operated in the rides waiver by this one entity compared to others brings them under special scrutiny.

As for operating maintenance and budget, their Mustangs lease engines from Roush whom is the holder of the only FAA repair station authorization for the Packard/Rolls Royce V-1650 Merlin. I don’t know where the 1820s on the B-17 are overhauled. Just an indication to me that Collings had and has a very good attitude towards safety, high quality maintenance and commitment to doing the right thing. I know they bought another B-17 before this accident with the intention of restoring it to airworthiness so 909 could be inspected and restored again which does not indicate a budget lacking but a long range plan of strategic maintenance.

The Fed is being overly cautious here and no doubt why, it is a safety issue no signer of a waiver wants to bet his FAA bureaucratic pension over…

The posters here seem to damn an organization they know little to nothing about not realizing their words are spread over all of the operators in this casual spew because there are others more casual still that think of all waiver ride givers as the same…

As for the poster that saw wheels rolling seconds after the hatch closed… the job of the flight engineer or crew chief is to observe for oil leakage after engine start and clearing of the area before motion, also after run up an oil leak observation is conducted, also at clean up or soon after take off a visual engine observation is taken… because if a leak is detected early a take off will not be attempted if said leak is detected at start or run up, or immediately after take off an engine shut down can be conducted in the planned emergency procedure before failure and destruction contribute to a worse emergency like a fire or propeller control failure.

This “wheels rolling seconds after hatch closing” poster’s conclusion is based on a premise more that of a subway train rider than a pilot with mechanical knowledge and is a peek at the ignorance of many commenting on the subject of the Collings Foundations B-17 accident in general.

22

July 20, 2007. The Collings Foundation was giving rides out of DuPage County Airport (DPA) west of Chicago. I was returning to the DeKalb, Il airport (DKB) 18 miles west of DPA after a training flight with a student. I made all the appropriate calls as we approached the airport and I heard three other pilots in the pattern announcing their positions. DKB is surrounded by lush green corn and bean fields in July. As we descended to pattern altitude I suddenly saw a flash of red in front of and just below us. I immediately recognized the red triangle on the tail and hauled back on the yoke. The Collings B-17 passed approximately100" below us, its olive drab paint a perfect camouflage against the green crops below. My student was alarmed when I suddenly hauled back on the yoke and never saw the B-17. I announced what had just happened and asked the other pilots in the pattern if I had missed a call or something. One of those pilots told me no, I hadn’t missed anything; that the B-17 had flown directly through the DKB traffic pattern at pattern altitude and never said a thing.

After wrapping up the lesson I drove to DPA to talk to the Collings pilots but was told by a ground crewmember that they had left for the day.

Pilots unfamiliar with the area? On the wrong Unicom frequency? They came within a second or two of a mid-air collision. Was this near mid-air the result of a lack of preparation? Did they fly out of so many airports that the areas just blur together? “Let’s give the rides then hurry on to the next airport?”.

23

If the condition of the ignition system on the number four engine is accurate, it speaks for itself. Is there another interpretation about the factual account that suggests it was really in airworthy condition? It begs a question about that high quality of maintenance and commitment to doing the right thing.

24

Scott,
In my air racing experience these big bore engines fail and are damaged quickly. When it failed, vibration, structural elasticity, and general catastrophic violence could have made everything from the points adjustment, spark plug clearances, detonation damage and the P-Lead stabilizing fix worn to ground happen in a very short period, like in seconds. I advise awaiting the final on this accident.

25

Chris M…"“In my air racing experience these big bore engines fail and are damaged quickly. When it failed, vibration, structural elasticity, and general catastrophic violence could have made everything from the points adjustment, spark plug clearances, detonation damage and the P-Lead stabilizing fix worn to ground happen in a very short period, like in seconds.”

In my experience fixing airplane engines and racing engines, when low compression radials, opposed 4/6 cylinder piston engines fail to develop rated power or even suffer catastrophic failure of a rod, crank, crankcase, piston, or cylinder, even at full throttle, I have never seen point adjustment changes, plug gaps change, or contribute to magnetos being out of service limits. I have helped perform NTSB investigative tear downs on a variety of aircraft engines that have been augured in or came apart due to something internally breaking and have never seen your description attributing the condition of the ignition system, plugs, or magnetos the NTSB found on the Collings B-17. I have seen weak and out of service limits magnetos, performing less then optimum ignition timing, and lack of accurate timing contribute to detonation damage over long periods of time.
The FAA description of the condition of the ignition system and the cylinders came from poor maintenance. Not only was it poor maintenance, someone went to the extent of doing a Rube Goldberg repair to the loose P-leads. Both engines three and four had similar issues. One engine was mid-time the other low time. Then, logbook entries lied about both the discrepancies and the repair of both engines. None of that happened as a result of “big bore engines fail and are damaged quickly”.

I have seen detonation damage, magneto failures, plug/valve/piston/cylinder destruction to racing engines who are being pushed so hard, developing two to three times their rated original power running manifold pressures that are mind boggling, turning RPM’s 30-40% past stock, with the addition of ADI operating on 130+ octane fuel with timing advanced well past any stock parameters. To suggest those two radial on the Collings B-17 was pushed to anywhere near those limits, had any ability to develop those kind of manifold pressures, and that catastrophic failure occurred to contribute to a worn out, purposefully jury rigged ignition system followed with pencil whipped log entries does not line up with any of the evidence. Have you read the FAA report?

Collings Foundation lost their LHFE because they lost control of the day to day maintenance of that particular airplane. They trusted a long-term DOM/chief pilot was being truthful handling all maintenance aspects of that airplane including accurate and complete documentation of the discrepancies and what should have been their subsequent repair… They trusted the flying credentials and the judgement of the DOM/Chief pilot that every flight would be safe and flown under LHFE compliance. Their LHFE was rescinded because they failed to verify.

Investigation of their overall operation will reveal if this was standard operating procedures for the remaining Collings Foundation LHFE warbirds. Award winning, high dollar restorations being poorly maintained and managed through a show season cannot be tolerated. I would like to think that what has previously appeared to be first class operation simply let this one airplane get away from LHFE procedures and their own Safety Manual Systems. We all wanted to “say it ain’t so”. The evidence is overwhelming regarding this particular airplane. There is nothing to defend.

26

After a skim of the NTSB Preliminary Reports and the comments, I have no doubt engine maintenance was the primary cause of this accident. And that cause lies squarely with the owner / operator of ‘909,’ the Collings Foundation.

The role of the pilot, who was also the maintenance officer (DOM), needs to be more thoroughly examined.

Let’s examine, for a moment, the final cause of the accident events chain: failure to maintain flying speed and altitude, sometimes described as energy management.

Let’s face it … hitting the ALS structures resulted in a loss of control, and a significant departure from the runway center-line. Why so slow, too slow? Why so low? Presumably the pilots knew the correct airspeed to maintain under those circumstances. Were the flaps positioned properly? They may have been… or not. Did the pilot in command (PIC) simply neglect to maintain airspeed in a no-flap configuration?

Sadly, it does appear that the accident was completely within the purview of the PIC / DOM, one way or another…

Was this tragic ending essentially unavoidable, given the loss of two engines on one side? Dunno. Perhaps…