Thankyou for illuminating facts.
A big deal is being made about semantics used in the headline as to whether it was a crash from air to ground or exclusively a ground crash. Who cares? It was a fatal crash either way.
The same driver of the fire and rescue truck presumably looks both ways before crossing a street intersection when in his personal vehicle but not at an airport? All runways must be assumed to be active. Trust nothing but your eyes and ears to ensure no conflict regardless of what ATC says. An unresolved conflict can be “discussed” with the tower controller or truck-mates later. Otherwise, give it the gun and get the hell off any runway and stay off until absolutely cleared after readback of clearance without objection or correction ((basic training). Yes, it was near midnight and probably a slow traffic time, but no excuse.
A terrible accident but like so many it was preventable. In the heat of the moment and handling a declared emergency it seems the controller cleared the fire truck to cross the runway the CRJ was landing on. From the video it looks like the fire truck was crossing at a 45 degree angle from a high speed turnoff. This is the worse possible place to cross an active runway as it creates unnecessary blind spots for the driver.
Two pilot flight crews deal with blind spots with a verbal call out of “clear left” or “clear right” is this procedure trained for airport vehicle drivers? if not it should be mandatory.
Since the introduction of ADS-B aircraft on the ground and in the air are visible on a I-Pad and this technology would have clearly shown and WARNED the truck driver that a aircraft was landing on the runway that he had been cleared to cross, this would be a extremely cheap backup technology to the often overloaded and task saturated controllers at airports like LaGuardia
I recently read that over 90% of our ATC facilities are short staffed and just like the midair in DC this was probably a contributing factor. I won’t get into the political details here but the controller shortage is and was caused by political decisions.
We deserve better from our government, let’s demand it now.
Always seemed cons and pros to me as neither controller nor pilot - one person doing both is fully aware of conflicts. (Unless overworked.)
Although the tragic mishap at LaGuardia has been initially assessed with a failure of the airport alert system and no transponder in the Fire Apparatus, the mishap’s primary causal factors come down to – “human error,”
Unfortunately, the tower controller lost “situational awareness” at some point after clearing two (2) CRJ aircraft to land – both with adequate separation on final. With his statement “I messed up,” it can be hypothesized that he didn’t recall the second acft landing as he probably cleared it to land well before short final. Thus, without visually scanning the RWY for landing traffic, he mistakenly cleared the fire engine to cross RWY 4 from DELTA taxiway. Obviously, he was oblivious to the CRJ decelerating and rolling out on the RWY.
No. 1 Causal Factor - poor situational awareness by the tower controller.
Also, as a retired Naval Aviator, ATP with over 10,000 hrs., Navy mishap investigator, and airport operations executive for 17 years, the one error that I believe is most telling is the fire engine crew most likely didn’t scan the RWY to ensure it was clear before crossing RWY 4. I can’t tell you how much we stressed this to all our ground vehicle operators at my two (2) airports that when in the “movement area” always ensure the RWY is clear even if given clearance by the tower controller.
In fact, as a student Naval Aviator, I was taught this practice early on in my flight training.
While tragic, the fire crew should have been more vigilant and ensured the RWY was clear before crossing.
No. 2 - Causal Factor - the fire crew didn’t visually scan and clear the RWY before crossing.
Although we have many, many systems on the ground and in the air to aid in maintaining traffic separation and potential collision warnings, it still boils down to the human condition and our ability to maintain keen situational awareness and good spatial orientation.
Unfortunately, humans aren’t infallible and in this mishap there were two instances where human failure combined – the “dominoes were aligned” - to result in a tragic mishap.
My heart goes out to families of the two pilots, the critically injured fire crew and all the others affected by this mishap.
I can assure you I investigated numerous Navy aviation mishaps were “pilot error//human error” was the primary causal factor.
Mark Denari
CAPT USN (ret)
Yes, hard to come up with a catch all solution that prevents basic human error. I just heard the timeline of events from the NTSB. They referred to all ATC side communications as ‘Tower’ but didn’t clarify the frequency used. On earlier posts of ATC audio the controller queried ground units if they were on tower or ground so I imagine if one controller in both positions the cleared to cross would have been transmitted on Tower and Ground Freq. This would raise a very slim window (20 seconds from collision) for the landing jet to hear the Tower clear Truck 1 to cross the runway they were landing on and go-around. (Obviously asking a lot of crew 10 seconds from touchdown) If the Truck 1 request was made on tower freq that would add another 5 seconds of heads up to the pilots landing. If both the request and permission to cross were all on ground freq then the pilots had zero chance of catching the controller error. Huge “Frequency Saturation vs Situational Awareness game” no matter how you slice it, I agree.
Definitely the easiest, low-tech solution is always look before you cross a street, runway, grocery store aisle. After another’s post, though, I do wonder what that would have involved given the 45deg angle taxiway Delta intersects runway 04. The driver would have to turn their gaze 130 degrees or more. The guy riding shotgun a little more to see the approach end of the runway. Do the truck windows even have a window/clear view out that direction? It looks like Truck 1 had enough taxiway apron to stop short of runway 04 at more than a 90deg angle (facing more toward the approach end of the runway) but that’s not a normal way to cross and brings all sorts of other risks.
Jeff,
I was the Operations Director at SFO and SAN. Although I was operating a four dour sedan in the movement areas, I can assure you I always visually scanned the RWY before crossing even when authorized by tower.
Of course, it’s much easier to see when you’re perpendicular to the RWY, but we had taxiways at both airports that were 45’s which did require a little more vigilance and energy to visually inspect the RWY.
But, the practice is one that absolute should be followed. As much as our FAA personnel are trained and are outstanding in every respect, you and I know there’s always the possibility that a “human failure” could happen. Not intentional by any means, but we humans aren’t perfect.
You know, I’ve commented on the DCA mishap on several aviation websites. While the NTSB barely addressed the issue, it was clear to me that the helo pilots didn’t see the CRJ and flew into it unknowingly. FAR Part 91, subpart 131(b) explains the concept of “see and avoid” incredibly well and what responsibility the pilot has to exercise this most basic flying practice.
As an owner of the Piper PA-28-180 Archer, I can’t tell you how many times I’ve had to take evasive action to avoid another acft that drifted into my approach corridor or in the area where I do high work. I think ADSB in/out is much needed and can be helpful, but I still practice “head out of the cockpit” to see and avoid. Although my car has great mirrors and an alert system to warn me of another vehicle approaching, I still look over my shoulder when I change lanes. But, that’s what I do to remain safe.
Anyway, I appreciate your thoughtful comment.
As the days roll on, I will venture to say we’ll not get to the real crux of the mishap as investigators will cite failures in staffing, systems, politics, etc, before they come to grips with the fact that human error was the primary cause of the mishap.
Who cares? Pilots care whether it was a crash or a ground collision. Everyone loves to say wait for the NTSB to drag out a 2 year investigation before having an opinion, however it’s all on video. A ground collision that was clearly not the fault of the pilots is a tragedy, but much better for the airlines than an actual aircraft crash involving a total loss of all passengers and crew. Some are saying it’s just semantics, and while that’s probably true, it still matters how this was reported. “Another CRJ crash” is very different than, “Firetruck pulls out in front of landing aircraft killing 2”
How we report things to the general public matters because a) all the money comes from the general public, and b) all the legislation comes from senators elected by the same general public.
I’m sure the fact that it wasn’t a “crash” but a collision will be quite comforting the families of the dead pilots.
Apparently they ignored and drove over the in pavement Runways Status Lights that are bright red like a stop light. If thats the case this is full onto fire truck. The towers last line of defense for his error would have been stopping because the RSL were on a red. I venture most haven’t seen these things in operation, fully automatic, they are impressive and very easy to interpret.
When the cockpit of the aircraft involved is totally obliterated, I would definitely call that a “crash.”
Never ever, ever … ever give permission to cross the runway when “anything” is on short, short final…never, never, ever …
Itll come out “short-handed ATC” bla, bla bla… just an accident , bla, bla and we promise to never buy a used Cadillac. Distracted ATC shorthanded with other problem, so busy , shorthanded … just on shift, no handoff … too busy and shorthanded.
Heads need to roll here … at least the ATC on the audio and truck driver … at a minimum
… for being human and making a mistake when overworked or even when the reason has yet to be discovered by our fledgeling sciences? It’s a sad state of affairs when we pretend we’ve evolved into a better species that by nature can’t make a mistake or that can be educated, trained or threatened to perform to perfection… and then persecute each other for not living up to our delusions.
We’d be living much happier and blissful lives if our hubris over our technological and personal achievements didn’t let us forget that we and our loved ones are still mortal and may die on account of a mistake made by others or by our own hand. As tragic and traumatic as that may be, it is an undeniable fact of life. May those who died rest in peace and may God grant comfort to their near and dear and anyone else traumatized by this tragedy.
In other words, they should be fired on the spot for being irresponsible, unprofessional and having zero common sense! There have been an extraordinary number of crashes, near misses, close calls and tarmac incursions and airplane contact since the ATC personnel hired during the Biden Administration where the qualifications were lowered to include DEI hiring. These needless incidents will continue until those unqualified personnel are filtered out by attrition.
I believe your assertions as to the lowering of qualifications and the qualifications of those involved in this accident are unqualified, unprofessional and false.
The Biden Administration adjusted hiring metrics for air traffic controllers (ATCs) by lowering the minimum scoring threshold on the Air Traffic Skills Assessment (ATSA) exam from 85% to 80% in 2023. If you believe this doesn’t have a direct correlation with commercial avaition fatalities since its implementation, then you simoly dont want to face the real life results, or in this case and many others, the real life fatalities of that decision to “equal the playing field”, to include a wider “umbrella” of race, gender and sex.
Insisting—without verification—that you are correct after being told you’re not is the very definition of bigotry. A simple Google search yields numerous reports by various media sources on the issue of qualifications for ATCs. In synopsis they all say the same thing. Here is the pertinent excerpt from the New York Post:
The Biden administration’s adjusted standards considered applicants “well-qualified” for scores of 80% and above, “qualified” for scores between 70% and 79.9%, and “not referred” for scores under 70%.
Under Duffy’s watch, the FAA has instituted a revised version of the prior ATSA grading system. Applicants are now separated into four tiers: “Best-qualified” for scores of 90% or more, “well-qualified” for scores between 85% and 89%, “qualified” for scores between 70% and 84%, and “not referred” for scores under 70%.
So, contrary to your assertion, the minimum qualification was 70% and is still 70%. The rest is merely an arbitrary division of the qualified into 2 or 3 meaningless subcategories that is not just a waste of time and effort, but also establishes the dangerous and perplexing notion that certain airports merit a lower standard of ATC service and therefore are assigned “qualified but inferior” controllers. It also creates completely unnecessary inter-personnel morale issues within a workforce that cannot afford such.
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