I would love to see the FOQA data from SWA to see how often things like this are occurring. I have a feeling unstable approaches, approaches well below and/or above glide path, and other procedural no-nos are more common than what we’ve heard.
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I’m pretty sure that’s only true until it is de-identified. Otherwise we would never see incident summaries during training. Either way, said gatekeepers can choose to release facts and figures. Personally, I’m not interested in who did it, just in how often and how badly it’s occurring.
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Policies and procedures are contained within various air carrier documents ie: GOM and SOPs for a reason. They are to be followed to ensure safe operations for the Pax, crew, cargo and the aircraft. The recent incidents were a result of deviation from those procedures. SW pilots have been trained, checked and rechecked throughout their tenure with the company. You can’t train stupid… There are always a select few that feel SOPs do not apply to them.
I wonder how much of that data, after analysis, resulted in a finding of either insufficient post-pandemic indoc training or insufficient implementation of it.
I’m confused by the wording. The quote at the bottom makes it sound like Southwest has elected on their own to provide additional training. But the opening paragraph makes it sound like they “are being required.”
I’m sure it’s something in the middle. Being “under review”, they elected, prior to any findings, to implement extra non-required training to “be proactive” in addressing shortcomings. Signaling to the public and the regulators their compliance and cooperation. I’m sure their proactive approach will be referenced in the findings and welcomed, along with some additional requirements to show the regulators required something. Safety happens sooner, and everyone did their jobs.
That convoluted paragraph probably reads worse than the actual description in the article but I was curious, for clarity, which is the case. Required or voluntary?
Maybe it has something to do with never progressing beyond the 73’s cramped flight deck.
Mike Whittaker could do his part by demanding more simulator training that is unscripted and can’t be prepared for with gouge. Require pilots to deal with systems failures that don’t fail like they’re supposed to. Or toss in what appears to be a minor distraction and see how it snowballs when stacked on a few non-normals. Or designate a few instructor pilots to play “bad actors” and see how personality issues can break down teamwork, communication and safety during sim sessions.
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Exactly right. An incident or data not shared is a missed opportunity to learn from. FOQA data is awesome, I have the privilege of seeing it and to process it appropriately so it can be used to improve flight safety.
That’s a great idea in theory, but the current Part 142 rules require structured syllabi and do not allow for much “free-styling” by the sim instructor.