I just flew my usual Monday 3 hour flight to work as a Cirrus driver. I am so grateful I don’t have to rely on the airlines. Sheesh… just yuck. And the madness this next week or so…
It already is on the after takeoff checklist yet it is common to fail to swap the bleeds from the APU on a bleeds off take-off. It is also common to forget to swap the generators on the classic and NG models. I’ve seen over a dozen take-off attempts with the stab trim not at takeoff setting after de-icing. Just because it is on the checklist it not a guarantor that it will get done, only a reduction of the odds.
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OK - but you can’t cure stupidity.
You have to temper the knee-jerk “they kept the pilot in the dark”. Let’s face it, everything made today is becoming swamped with software-controlled systems, to the point there is no longer any way a pilot can be expected to retain an understanding of every process going on in the background. As in this case, the ultimate “fix” is most often going to be a software update rather than one more pilot responsibility.
Here we go again!
When a runaway stab trim occurs the pilots don’t know what is causing it—the procedure to handle it doesn’t require such knowledge. Why should they need to know when it is being caused by MCAS? Or that MCAS even exists? To maintain the delusion that a pilot knows everything?
Pilot lack of knowledge of the procedure to handle a runaway stabilizer trim was the cause of the two MAX crashes. The flight data recorders show that the pilots reflexively used elevator control and electric trim to successfully counter the pitch and altitude deviations caused by the runaway trim each time it occurred, made easier because MCAS’ nose-down trim operation was designed to be interrupted and held in suspense by pilot use of the electric nose-up trim. But the pilots didn’t give the slightest hint that they had even heard of a runaway stabilizer trim condition, let alone knew what to do about it, i.e. turn off the electric trim system, and how. (A FO with an MPL knew the key action to take, likely having read it in the newspapers, his Captain didn’t). That is procedural action—not reflexive flying skill—that is required to be taught as part of the basic type rating training. The knowledge and correct execution is required to be reinforced and verified periodically by recurrent training. Required to be means different things in different countries. English allows plenty of nuance.
Nothing surprising in the NTSB’s statement; a prejudiced mind is easily led astray and the NTSB keeps on demonstrating that it is easily prejudiced by the opinions of ultracrepidarians ranging from pilot union representatives trying to get reelected to news media reporters chasing a Pulitzer Prize and members of Congress trying to show that they do something—anything, even if damaging. The prejudice renders their cause-effect analyses invalid, sometimes demonstrably erroneous, which casts doubt on the NTSB’s overall competence. No surprise that the Ethiopian investigative agency roundly ignored the NTSB’s criticisms and recommendations for correcting their crash investigation report, twice. Ouch!
The worldwide grounding of the model was a charade—a very expensive, very damaging and very unnecessary charade driven by an unethical media and wannabe experts jostling for their 15 minutes of fame in the limelight and politics. The result was the dangerous suppression of the true cause of the crashes and the yet-to-be-realized deception of the families and friends of those who died. As Mark Twain said, “It is easier to fool people than it is to convince them that they have been fooled.” Some won’t be convinced even when the unaddressed cause results in another crash, as it surely will —if it hasn’t already.
You mean we can’t count on pilots to do what is required?! So much for the argument against pilotless ops.
Pilot operating manuals are instructions on how to OPERATE the airplane, not explain its design and features that have no OPERATIONS for the pilots to perform. Principles of human factors engineering require that the manuals not be cluttered up with extraneous information as such will impede the retrieval of operational information and be detrimental to safety.
I know pilots can’t be expected to understand every system on a modern jet. But when the pilots have to decide whom to douse with chemicals during a flight, it seems like something they should be aware of…
Meanwhile, is it just these engines? What are other manufacturers doing differently?