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Sad.
Sad.
Special VFR? That implies that the pilot or the aircraft may not have been equipped for IFR flight, and the conditions were reportedly IMC along the coast. Seems like they were basically scud running, which is risky in any kind of aircraft.
Sounds like a classic case of get-there-itis. It’s really sad.
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If the reported weather is less, a pilot can request a Special VFR Clearance. Several conditions must be met; the visibility must be at least one statue mile, the pilot must remain clear of clouds and at night, the pilot must be instrument rated in an IFR capable aircraft.
Low altitude urban flying in poor visibility is tricky at best.
Even a minor distraction or mechanical issue can instantly be deadly.
But we all know this.
This model helicopter is capable of IFR. But, IFR also requires being at minimum instrument altitude and on a route ATC can approve in the very busy airspace along the route of this ill-fated flight.
Unless rules have changed since my ATC time, SVFR can only be approved in Surface Areas of class B,C,D airspace. Without pulling up a LAX sectional, I don’t think the class B surface area covers very much territory. Sounds like they were coming up from the southeast of LAX and needed clearance through that LAX surface airspace to get up to the NW. The L.A. area has huge numbers of helicopters operating all around there constantly and have various procedures established for them. I’m guessing a pilot of an L.A. area S76 would have been very familiar with all of that and used the process frequently. So, the SVFR part was probably not an issue. The terrain does have big hills past LAX. So back to the scud running, which helicopters actually are permitted to do more so than fix wing or maybe a mechanical thing. Frank Tallman, as experienced and as familiar with the L.A. area as he was, scud running hit the hills out there and got killed.
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News said that there were several witnesses.
Not always reliable, but would like to hear what they said.
Sounds like they might still be alive if he had filed IFR, unless the crash came from equipment failure.
The ATC audio is up several places. No way was this pilot flying in VMC.
You got that right!
I know about where this happened from a road sign and a witnesses comment in Raf’s video. Las Virgenes Rd and Mureau Rd is in an area of a lot of canyons both north and south of the 101 Freeway located WSW of Van Nuys. Even in the video, you can see raw hills. This is 15 mi east of the ultimate destination in Thousand Oaks. He had no business being down that low in that location I’m betting he was looking to find the 101 Freeway? The Flight Aware ground track ends just about where the crash occurred, too.
According to the adult witness, the machine was producing power, was flying very low and very slow and now going eastbound … indicating the pilot was scud running and looking for something ?? But he was 15 miles east from his destination ?? Why was he so low there ??
The witness in the video says he’d lived in the area a long time and never seen such low clouds and scud.
What happened to Climb Communicate Confess and Comply? If the pilot had just Climbed, he’da been in VFR conditions albeit maybe “on top” So what? Didn’t we all just talk about FAR 91.3 in the fuel dumping incident. I’m wondering what sort of nav equipment or glass screens the helicopter had? Surely he’d have known he was in those hills … which are very uninhabited. Hell, my Aera 660 portable will tell me … “Terrain Terrain.”
It appears they were headed to his Mamba Sports Academy in Thousand Oaks about 15 mi west of the crash scene. If nothing else, the pilot could have climbed and headed to the Camarillo airport which is about 10 mi west of their destination. They could have gotten ground transport from there.
They’re touting the pilot as a “qualified” 8,200hr CFI instrument rated pilot and the S-76 surely had some good nav gear aboard … what the heck was that guy doing down in the soup around 1100’? Lots of questions here. And … flying single pilot in such conditions wasn’t very smart, either. Even if he had a private pilot aboard to help him navigate, it woulda probably gone better.
There’s gonna be a lot to be learned from this CFIT evolution.
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Looking at the VFR chart for that area, minimum safe altitude was 5,200’ The Ventura VOR could have been used to navigate either to Camarillo or Oxnard or NAS Point Mugu to get his ‘bearings’ and find the 101 Freeway. I’m seeing peaks in the area around where he went down of almost 3,000’. I’m betting that – on top of everything else – he was under verbal pressure inside the aircraft to get to the destination, as well.
It’s possible the SAS and/or autopilot wasn’t functioning, in which case it could have been nearly impossible to maintain stability and control without outside references. Helicopters are not airplanes, so it’s possible it wasn’t as simple as “climb above the fog/cloud layer”. We won’t know if that’s the case until we get more information from the investigation, but it is certainly something to consider. It still doesn’t remove “pilot error” (i.e. a poor decision to fly at all in that weather) from the possible cause, though.
My purely speculative guess as to why they were flying low-level VFR is that either: the required equipment for single-pilot IFR wasn’t available on-board (either not installed, or not working), OR it was available but the pilot wanted to avoid possible delays on an IFR clearance combined with the fact that they still would have had to go visual to land off-airport. And helicopter VFR limits are much lower than for aircraft (presumably because a helicopter can just slow down and is more maneuverable than an airplane).
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An S-76 can’t be “controlled” just by reference to horizon and heading instruments? I highly doubt that. Once in translational lift, a helicopter IS an airplane. I might buy into that in a hover but not in cruise. As I said above, find the Ventura VOR and/or Camarillo airport and THEN decide if you want to descend into the soup or tell the tower you want to make a precautionary landing. And I’d additionally wonder why the Lat/Long of the destination wasn’t dialed into a GPS, too. This is nothing more than pilot error resulting in CFIT.
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I can’t speak to the S-76 specifically, but certainly the Robinson helicopters aren’t as easy to control by instruments as with an airplane. It’s certainly possible (they are used as instrument helicopter trainers), but that pretty much requires two people (and even then, they aren’t approved for flight in IMC). I don’t disagree with the alternative you mention, but again, it could be that the required equipment for single-pilot operations wasn’t available. The radar rate of descent in the final moments does seem consistent with helicopter loss-of-control (i.e. potential rotor stall).
Did you ever notice how nice the days are for the NTSB to investigate right after a crash like this?
This accident is starting to look more and more like the Gulfstream accident in Aspen. In both cases experienced flight crew flying into weather situations that they should have known better then to fly in. Without being disrespectful of the deceased, I wonder what kind of owner Mr Bryant was to fly for? Was there “pressure” to fly into weather that the pilot should have known better than to attempt? RIP
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BINGO! It almost HAS to be at least a significant ingredient in the final outcome.
I’ve only flown two helicopters, the R22 being one of them. It is the ONLY aircraft that I can honestly say I hated. The low mass rotor system is an accident looking for a place to happen. A two turbine S-76 multi-blade helicopter is an entirely different machine. If the highly touted 8200 hr pilot was SO good, why was he flying single pilot VFR in – at best – very marginal conditions? All roads in this evolution lead to the pilot. When you’re about to smack into a hill and you pull back on the collective … you’re gonna stall … duh.
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Thank you Ricky. You’re absolutely right. We weren’t there, so we don’t know for sure what was the real cause.
The Board member is a politician. The real leader of the investigation is the investigator in charge. In this case, it is Bill English. I’ve worked with Bill in the past. He is as good as they get. Someone mentioned the Aspen Gulfstream crash. Bill ran that investigation.
Probably for the same reason many other highly-experienced pilots do dumb things: they felt pressured and thought they could complete the mission, and then got locked into get-there-itis. Assuming it was a VFR-into-IMC crash, the worst part is that he could have set down almost anywhere and waited out the weather - that’s the whole point of a helicopter: that you can land in almost any spot that is a little bit bigger than the rotor diameter.
yep makes you wonder are there any pilots on this blog. very sad. no one was there but somehow have all the facts.
On skyvector.com the TFR is centered 17nm WSW of Burbank.
I’ve been in a helicopter scud running, it is pretty hairy as you fly past the telegraph poles following the road. It was a military chopper and we were on a rather imprtant mission for the Foreign Office, hence the scud running to the High Commission to pick up our diplomat. Not recommended unless you REALLY HAVE to be there!!!
Sfter the pick-up the chopper dropped us at a civilian airstrip so it could refuel at a VTOL only fuelling stop. Filled the long-range tank in the cabin then picked us up for a rolling take-off.
The return journey was almost as hair-raising as the cloud base was lkower than tha peaks of the mountain range we had to traverse. The Pilots found a way through eventually after a few false starts up cloud covered valleys.
The ADS-B data shows that the pilot had indeed intercepted the 101 freeway out near Woodland Hills, which despite its name, is fairly flat and densely populated. He intercepted the 101 from a southwesterly track because ATC had routed him north of the Burbank and Van Nuys airports, to avoid some IFR departures which were coming off to the south. He then tracks the 101 dead on all the way into the Calabasas area, which is several miles, so the indications are that he has visibility below the aircraft at this point. He’s flying at 1250 ft calibrated altitude and 130 knot ground speed heading into this area, but Calabasas is where the 101 starts winding through the hills. After the first couple of turns of the 101, the aircraft starts gaining altitude, and the pilot informs ATC that he is climbing to avoid a cloud deck. One eyewitness describes this area as “a bowl, with its own microclimates”. Tracking a ground reference, like the 101 freeway, at low altitude, high speed, and winding through hills, it may have been impossible to see an approaching decrease in the cloud ceiling until after coming around the bend. Heck, I’ve done it in a car in the mountains, on a windy road, and that’s at low speed. Came around the bend, and suddenly I’m in the soup. The climb and the initial speed decrease to 110 knots was most likely the best response if this was the case, but why the aircraft subsequently turns left and descends rapidly, will be the key for investigators to determine (if possible).
”Monday quarterbacking”? More like learning from other people’s experience.
Yes, according to the NTSB briefing on Tuesday, the flight was operating under Part 135 charter, and according to several articles (e.g., Forbes, CNN), “Island Express Helicopters, a Long Beach-based company that has seven helicopters registered to it and a related holding corporation, is certified under Part 135 of FAA regulations to provide on-demand charter services under VFR conditions only, according to FAA records.”.
I’m not a pilot, but I wonder if Artificial Intelligence is not mature enough be used to detect an erratic flight or vertigo situation and emit consequently a strong warning to the pilot, like “correct attitude/bank now” etc.
There are larger issues with flying members of the public in warbirds:
Warbirds are inherently dangerous. Bomber engines seem to be prone to fluid leaks and fires.
The public assumes there’s no risk when somebody takes their money and says to get on the plane, and rightfully so. They don’t have the experience to say, “Wait a minute. This is an 80 year-old plane that was just substantially rebuilt a few years ago.”
We used to do air shows with the flight line over the crowd. We don’t do that any more because of several accidents. Regarding warbirds, at a minimum, only informed passengers should fly on the plane.
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We all know that maintenance is expensive and time consuming especially with aging aircraft. With that said there is no excuse for this type of shoddy care on 80 year old warbirds that fly passengers. The issue with the mags is an inexcusable lack of concern for public safety. In this case I agree with the FAA and the Company should get its act together before they can fly again.
Agree, so much easier to say ‘NO’ then work on better practices and programs.
New parts and new run in engines with cowls and engine mounts already installed (bolt on) were very plentiful in WW2 days not so now. It takes very good and knowledgeable maintenance personnel to keep these machines up to snuff. A person would be hard pressed to find a good mech. to climb up on those greasy engines in 20 something degrees F with snow out and clean/gap sp. plugs and change mags and for what? A joy ride around the patch. Its all hind sight now but unprofessional/bandaid maint. caught up and now the Feds. dropped the hammer.
I find it hard to blame the maintenance personnel. These aircraft ARE different than something built today–those engines were built to last a couple of hundred hours AT MOST–given their operating conditions.
After saying that, there ARE differences in “paying passengers” for airlines and commercial operators–vs. those that want to fly in one of these rare warbirds. I’ve flown Aluminum Overcast and Yankee Lady for magazine articles–the guys do a great job of keeping them airborne. The record up until now of these aircraft on tour has been superb–only in hindsight is the FAA now worried. Was the FAA wrong THEN, or is it wrong NOW?
To protect the “unaware public”, perhaps the Warbird community should take a page from the Skydiving Tandem Jump operators. Rather than just sign a waiver, most Tandem jump operators require the prospective Tandem jumper to watch a video. Far from glamorizing the Tandem jump, they read off a litany of things that CAN go wrong. Far from making it look glamorous, they use actors that often look “odd”. In short, they lay it out straight–“Participating in this activity is DANGEROUS–IT MAY INJURE OR KILL YOU!” There is no question of “protecting the unaware public” after watching that video and signing the paper. As of a few years ago, there had not been a successful claim against Tandem jumping. Perhaps Paul can elaborate on what is being done in Tandem jumping today.
Did pointing out (or even emphasizing) the danger hurt Tandem jumping? An emphatic NO–but it certainly provides a good defense–and it certainly has allowed thousands of people to experience something they have always wanted to do by inoculating the providers against the “nanny state.”
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Jim,
I believe you are on the right track. Seeing Bill Booth with his ZZ-Top beard looking straight at the camera and saying in a calm voice, “skydiving can kill you”, well, it’s hard to tell a jury you weren’t informed after seeing that.
Regular skydiving has similar waivers and warnings, and even goes so far as to say they will sue YOU (or your survivors) if you try to sue the drop-zone. I know of one case where this was successfully prosecuted. That particular DZ spent more money than they’d ever hope to recover, but wanted to set a precedent that a countersuit would be filed and would win.
All that being said - such waivers are no protection against true shoddy practices. Just because the customer signed a waiver doesn’t mean one can skimp on maintenance. The problem then comes down which side can better explain to a jury the difference between “inherent risk” and “negligence.”
Bingo! 75 year old warbirds ARE inherently dangerous, even when NEW!
What we saw here was a FOUR engine airplane being incapable of a simple return to airport.
Even the great pilots could not make the relatively simple return when they had an engine problem.
it’s NOT maintenance, it’s 1930’s tech and planes designed only to last 30 hours…
Yep, enough is enough. I was part of these programs some years ago and have first hand knowledge of “how it goes”. Also i am guilty of piloting those airplanes with paying pax whilst knowing that there may be issues. Taking your buddies for a ride in a vintage aircraft is one thing but charging people for the privilege when you know that reliability cannot be reasonably guaranteed is another. I flew paying pax on DC-3s 45 years ago. And it was dicey then. Nothing has changed since taht time. Same engines, same parts, same “fixes” and guess what… Less proficient pilots.
I recall the Commemorative Air Force B-29 “FIFI” making a stop in Lincoln, Nebraska. One engine needed to be replaced. FIFI sat on the general aviation ramp at Lincoln for several weeks before the engine was pulled and replaced and runup tested on the aircraft. Spare parts for WWII aircraft are not easy to come by.
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I was a pilot at TWA from 1964-1990. TWA retired its last piston aircraft (Constellation) in April, 1967. The mechanics that worked on those giant piston engines soon lost those piston skills to work on the big jets, a very different maintenance world. Plus, while the giant piston airplanes were around there was an abundant stock of parts. Also, the Connies and Martins were not war machines.
Hard to imagine that the run-up on #3 & 4 engines checked out OK. but, we will never know! Shame
The problems the FAA are citing Collings Foundation is poor maintenance, poor record-keeping of maintenance performed, and maintenance people unaware of operational procedures/requirements of the LHFE program. The FAA’s refusal to reissue the LHFE program to Collings is based on all of the above. Consent given to fly on any LHFE assumes that the warbird owner(s) are following FAA mandated LHFE requirements.
I believe there is more to this story. The FAA has released SOME of their reasons for refusing to reissue the exemption but not all. Nor has the Collings Foundation responded. This situation is like a divorce. There are two sides to the story with truth somewhere in between.
The maintenance evidence thus far presented does not look good for Collings. However, there is a certain amount of trust in performing aircraft maintenance expected. The question is how do you ensure that? FAA rules and regulations try to ensure compliance. But those rules and regulations cannot guarantee that an individual will not perform sloppy work. Another question is what did the pilots know about the condition of those two engines before take-off? It has been determined that there was some kind of maintenance performed on those engines prior to flight. Were the engines in question making full rated take-off power? Or were they making enough power to satisfy the pilots for a quick local flight with further maintenance when back on the ground? Ultimately, the PIC is responsible for determining the airworthiness of the airplane. The FAA has not released all that they know about these questions.
Evidence of engine detonation shows that timing was far enough off to reveal some engine damage. We don’t know the extent of that detonation damage. Any signs of that is certainly not good. Fouled plugs, weak or non-existent spark, loose P-leads, spark plugs improperly gapped, worn cam followers, and magneto points out of limits has nothing to do with the chronological age of the engine. Don’t care for your new IO-550 the same way? You get the same results. Parts and their condition thus far cited by the FAA are normal, relatively common found items.
Is this the type of maintenance performed and seen on other Collings warbirds? Is there a pattern of slipshod maintenance through out the Collings Foundation’s other airplanes? We know none of this information.
The Collings Foundation has had a reputation for award winning restorations. None-O-Nine had been flying passengers regularly for decades prior to the accident flight. Prior to this accident, it has always appeared to me the organization has been top notched in all that it has done regarding the preservation/restoration of historical warbirds. The FAA has had a verifiable history of proper LHFE compliance by the Collings Foundation for decades. And, if the corrections are made as per the FAA LHFE program requirements, it appears the Colllings Foundation could get it back.
Was the overall series of maintenance procedures and pilot decisions leading to the crash of Nine-O-Nine something indicative of the overall culture of the Collings Foundation? I would like to think no. But it is clear mechanically, there were several serious maintenance issues on the two engines in question. Time will tell.
If allowed to stand, this is likely the end of available rides in historic aircraft–and perhaps some NON-Aeronautical activities.
If ANYTHING goes wrong, there will be the usual finger-pointing and chant of “SOMEBODY should have seen this!”
Insurance companies will decline to insure the aircraft–and we will be left with no flying examples–with the possible exception of those transferred to a foreign country to escape the U.S. “Nanny State.”
These aircraft are NOT as reliable as today’s transports. When they were built, they were “cutting edge”–new designs–engine technology pushing it limits, and engine failures were common. They were “good enough” for expectations at the time–most combat aircraft were expected to last only a couple of hundred hours.
Contrast these primitive piston-pounders with the turbine reliability today–you will never approach that reliability with piston engines. Does that mean that operation for hire (or even NOT for hire) of all piston powered aircraft should be banned?
Collings Foundation had an enviable safety record prior to this accident. It’s hard to believe that their “Corporate Culture” changed to “allow” this to happen–sometimes, accidents DO happen–a faulty part–mismanaged operation of an engine between maintenance events–or a repairman that just didn’t get the procedure right. This shouldn’t be the end of the right of people to experience the flight of older aircraft–even when they have acknowledged the danger. We should be free to take known risks by acknowledging them–whether in riding in old aircraft, doing aerobatics, skydiving, or rock climbing. Leave the Bureaucrats and Barristers out of our lives!
In this case, it WAS MAINTENANCE (the lack of it) that caused the crash. Read the reports. Mags held together with safety wire. All the plugs are bad. Inspections long overdue. A reckless attitude toward safety was what crashed the 909. Don’t blame it on 1930’s tech.
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For years, the most important thing to senior FAA decision makers is “How will this play on the front page of the New York Times”. Their biggest fear is the question from a reporter “How could “YOU LET” this aircraft crash?” Easiest way to prevent accidents?-Prevent aviation.
these forums are amazing, same experts have the answer for all incidents. amazing !!
Jim, Sorry but that first sentence is just not correct. It is 100% the fault of maintenance personnel. And those engines do not just last hundreds of hours, that is incorrect information. Sure, cylinders and other components are changed out regularly.
These planes have crew chiefs that are “responsible” for the airplane’s operation. Someone knew what was rigged. And, BTW, no excuse for the plugs not even being gapped properly. That’s all you do on those engines, swap plugs, leads and mags. 50% of all round engine problems are ignition related. These planes need to keep flying, pilots and mechanics are volunteering their time just to be part of the experience and many “maintenance guys” are not even rated. I’m not making that up and I’ve seen it with my own eyes. It’s a lot of fun and good camaraderie. It’s a privilege to be part of such an operation and the show must go on. Unfortunately it’s coming to an end and rightfully so, in my opinion.
There’s a lot of talk about these radial engines going 200 hrs max? I have flown behind 1340’s and 985’s and although its not a jet engine it is fairly reliable with a tbo of around 1200 to 1400 hrs. With that said it takes good maint. and upkeep to make it there. Synthetic oils and the like have vastly improved since 1942. With this B17 it is obvious that maint. was lacking, it was not loaded to gross weight+ with a load of 500 bombs and probably would have made it with 1 engine failure but not 2. These planes are only as good as there upkeep. As the old saying goes…If you don’t schedule maint. it will schedule it for you.
And yet, I’ve met bomber pilots from that era who said that after the war, that they would never set foot in one ever again. They understood the high risk and only flew because it was a wartime need. Planes were rapidly “designed” and built by people who had never even seen a plane before. Many killed ferry pilots who were tasked with delivery. Bob Hover crash an untold number of new planes when he worked at a depot. Add 75 years of wear and tear and lack of spare parts and organizations (without the unlimited funds of a wartime government) trying to keep them going and it’s going to end badly. No one can afford to give ancient 4 engine piston bombers “proper” maintenance so that is a given.
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75 years of wear and tear ?? Most of these warbirds have had many, many skins and many parts of sub-structure dis-assembled, replaced and re-assembled. This airplane WASN"T flying with magnetos that had not been touched in 75 years, or the SAME magnetos for 75 years. It’s a absolute given the mags and plugs needed to be Inspected and measured, and at least 1 magneto replaced, but the costs of just that level of maintenance are not so expensive, that one would say “No One Can Afford to Give Ancient 4 Engine Piston Bombers “proper” Maintenance” – Nothing about the 909 crash I’ve read in the FAA points to “to expensive” or “too old”… Rather, I am seeing “Callous disregard and Willful negligence” at worst, or possibly “Laziness” , and at the mildest “flying too much / too frequently or flying on too tight of a schedule”. The lack of training and instruction given the Crew Chief IS just pitiful over-sight and organization management. IF that fault falls on the (deceased) Pilot In Command (RIP), who was ALSO the Chief of Maintenance – another example of really bad organization and lack of checks/balances ---- then that is just more poor management.
But do NOT paint the other Warbird operations with the same paintbrush. I’ve been around and worked with a handful of organizations that maintain their a/c by the manufacturer’s certified instructions and FAA regulations (sometimes according to an FAA-reviewed and approved maintenance plan), that use new and properly yellow-tagged parts, and were absolutely willing to tell the public ‘sorry, we cannot fly, the airplane is not ready and needs some work and a check-out’.
And the CAF / Fifi example is not unusual and not unheard of. Parking it someplace until you have the correct, required, serviceable parts is the minimum that it needs to be.
A Lancaster’s expected life was 14 missions, not necessarily because it lacked robust design in parts or engineering, it had a great deal to do with being SHOT AT from the ground and from the air, almost each time it went out on a mission, often for extended periods, and the statistical probability of being shot down, or the ship being so badly damaged it wasn’t worth the labor cost to rebuild, factored in to produce a low number like 14 missions.