LarryS
“Bureacracy is the death of any achievement”
Albert Einstein
“The US has government of the people, by the bureaucrats, for the bureaucrats”
Milton Friedman
“Bureacracy is the death of any achievement”
Albert Einstein
“The US has government of the people, by the bureaucrats, for the bureaucrats”
Milton Friedman
Hi, LarryS. Thanks for the epithets. Any suggestions to help improve the situation?
Friedman would probably advocate for the system that was in place at Boeing - let the manufacturer largely self-regulate, and let the market decide whether their product is safe enough to consume. That may work (in theory) for hair driers or electric shavers, but when the test of the effectiveness of the company’s QA is an aluminum tube holding 200 precious souls at 39,000 ft, I would prefer a review from a set of eyes that answers to the public, not the company.
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Thank you Jon for calling out the epithets - a favorite currency of the old comment section but hopefully not the new one.
You’re spot on with “when the test of the effectiveness of the company’s QA is an aluminum tube holding 200 precious souls at 39,000 ft, I would prefer a review from a set of eyes that answers to the public, not the company.” I would add, “especially this particular company at this particular time in its existence.”
This was my first reaction to this story. Where were the FAA inspectors? Who left those bolts out and was there some motive to do so? It is certainly not unheard of where union employes do stupid things when negotiation time comes around. It was floor workers who left these out. A fact that seems to be overlooked. When will the bureaucrats call those involved to answer questions? The constant clamoring over cultural issues should not excuse those assigned a simple task of properly installing four bolts.
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Sigh.
Mis-use of the English language: Epithet - Wikipedia
Conspiracy theory about union negotiations never mind date of when the error occurred.
Qwerlity in AvWeb comments? Nope.
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I recommend you read past issues of AvWeb to learn of results of various hearings by NTSB and US Congress, including NTSB grilling cognizant floor workers and managers and record keepers.
Boeing was sloppy.
A Problem is people depending too much on regulation when choosing a supplier, not enough thinking for themselves.
And trade restrictions - read of action by US persons against Bombardier’s C-Series.
(Which backfired on whiner Boeing, product is now the A220 and selling as fast as they can be produced - a better airliner than Boeing’s Max7.)
Note all major airplane manufacturers are propped up by taxpayer money, especially Airbus and Bombardier - Boeing and Embraer less directly.
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Pardon my misuse of the term ‘epithet’. I only got a B in freshman English - though I might argue that ‘bureaucrat’ is an epithet.
Whatever the case, Boeing was given the authority to oversee its own engineering and safety program. They were accountable only to themselves. Maybe one of AvWeb’s writers can expound on the origins of the designated authority program, but whatever the case, Boeing appears to have abused it to the public’s detriment.
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So avoid fancy language.
I’m shocked (shocked!) that anyone is surprised by this totally predictable step in this story-arc. In any complex system involving humans, there will be failure points with vanishingly small probability that cannot (and arguably should not) be addressed. The hope is that, with proper training and inspection mechanisms in place, issues will be identified and rectified before they rise to the level of flight safety. I’m fairly confident that a MAX9 could not lift off if the seats were removed and its only cargo was the paperwork that was necessary for its production. The best processes and procedures “gang aft agley” when implemented by humans.
By all accounts, this was the result of an anomalous circumstance for which no inspection procedure was in place, or could have been anticipated, coupled with lower management issues, none of which were the direct result of FAA oversight, nor could be reasonably placed at the feet of a federal agency.
This hearing is nothing more than political “counting coup” which will do nothing to prevent such an event from occurring again in such a Godelian “sufficiently complex system”.
I think I’ve read about all there is to read about this topic. In this country there is an anti-corporate mentality. And most of that is generated by the left-wing politicians who constantly use it for their benefit. They simply love to divide. Those politicians with good intentions likely have no idea what questions should be asked and if they did, they certainly would not jeopardize a single vote and ask it. And for that matter, it is doubtful the FAA does either. The simple fact remains that even with the worst possible “cultural issues”, those very well-paid workers were asked to do a very simple but very important task, and they botched it. I can guarantee you that should a licensed mechanic do the same on any other aircraft, there would be punishment involved. I would at least like to hear how these persons were reprimanded if at all. And it is these very same types that have now shut down Boeing making demands that are every bit as greedy as any management. Nothing like kicking your dog when it’s down.
The only problem with the A220 is nobody including Airbus have yet to make a buck off it yet. And it seems the PW engine issues are creeping into it also. At last report, approx. 20% of them are grounded. On a recent trip I flew in both the A220 and the Max. Twice. I really don’t see what all these positive posts of the A220 are about. It’s just another cramped, noisy commuter type. I’ll take the Max any day. Assuming I ever had a choice. Apparently the number one thing about the A220 is that it doesn’t have the Boeing label on it. I can only wonder what if Boeing had bought it what your (and so many others) opinion of it would then be?
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When I taught A&P courses many years ago, on the very first night – before formal classroom work started – I made an hour long talk about ‘being an airplane mechanic and what that means.’ Among the points … the purpose of discipline. By being disciplined (not punished), a person develops self-discipline no longer needing the long arm of someone else to ensure proper conduct when no one was looking over your shoulder. It’s easy to take the easy road; not so easy to do things right. THAT was my point. Basic military training serves the same function.
With my ‘epithets,’ my point was that Boeing was responsible to do the work properly in the first place, has QA functions to make sure anyways and Government rep responsibility on top of that not to mention union complicity. ALL failed. Why? Too much bureaucracy and not enough self-discipline.
As far as the FAA Bureaucracy, same story, different flavor. The FAA can lead people to water but can’t make 'em drink. So the Administrator comes tap dancing in front of Congress with some great stories because THEY didn’t enforce things properly either.
So how do you fix all of this. SImplify and enforce self-discipline. The constant push for ‘productivity’ vs. quality is part of the problem. Ultimately, a line worker didn’t do his/her job and there’s a reason for that?
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Thanks for expanding on your thoughts, LarryS. The problem with self-discipline as a solution is that people are a) fallible, b) selfish and c) lazy (not all people, of course). QA is a best practice specifically for that reason. The question is, who is responsible for QA - a regulator whose first duty is the public, or a company employee whose first duty is to the shareholders? We’ve seen from the Boeing example that there appears to be little penalty for actually putting out a dangerous product under the current system. Dennis Muilenberg is still a free, wealthy man, and the people in Ethiopia and Indonesia are still dead.
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This situation goes a lot further back than just the FAA. It was Congress years before the 737 Max was certified who pressured the FAA to speed up approvals for more FAA designated manufacturers representatives. Unfortunately the current administrator was not in office when all that occurred. Maybe that committee should go over past committee records to see if the past committee chairpersons should share in some of the responsibility.
No, it is economical - fuel efficient and if less capacity better for some airlines.
P&W’s engine problems affect other models as well.
Yes, good point about production cost, Airbus is working on that but …
I find this situation baffling, but I don’t hold the FAA directly responsible. While the FAA is accountable for ensuring proper oversight of aircraft, it isn’t expected to inspect every detail, like the attachment of four bolts. Its role is to ensure manufacturers like Boeing have effective systems in place to catch such issues. If those systems fail, the FAA is responsible for inadequate oversight, not for missing specific details. However, the potential for catastrophic outcomes from sloppy practices is a serious concern that demands attention.
Should the FAA hire more inspectors and increase oversight, or are the current rules sufficient, with the focus needing to shift toward better enforcement and smarter, data-driven inspections—and at what cost burdens would these changes come?
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And what set of eyes would you suggest? What would this new agency in charge of aircraft safety be called? The FASA?
As Friedman would point out, we already have an agency that answers to the public in charge of aircraft safety. We have volumes of FARS, CFRS and other regulations and laws on the books. Those regulations were ignored and/or at least massaged to get around key aspects of those regulations.
Perhaps a dozen or so new regulations and a new agency, with a the caveat *Hey, we really, really mean it this time?
The market will always speak first and the loudest: I will never fly Boeing again.
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The problem with regulators and regulations as a solution is that people are a) fallible, b) selfish and c) lazy (not all regulators, of course).
I’ll take a healthy dose of Larry’s self discipline before I’d add another regulation or regulator.
No need for a new agency. The FAA would be just fine, if they received the funding and support from Congress necessary to carry out proper oversight, and had the enforcement powers that could truly hold management accountable for negligence or malfeasance. My understanding is that these conditions are missing - somebody correct me if I’m wrong. With a nod to Raf’s point, the system as designed can work, provided Boeing is held properly accountable for its inspection activities.
Good luck with your Boeing boycott, Robert. From my travels this summer, it didn’t look like it was catching on with the flying public generally, but who knows?
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Then the market has spoken.
Why add additional regulation, additional funding, additional regulators when the flying public is perfectly happy with the status quo?
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Well, Robert, when the market consists of a duopoly and the only alternative to consuming a company’s essential product is to not consume that essential product, regulators should step in to ensure that companies don’t abuse their market power. The market’s response is not the only reaction of consequence to corporate malfeasance. The chances of you being injured or killed by a Boeing aircraft are vanishingly small, so your individual boycott of their aircraft (if you truly are conducting one) really only hurts you, not Boeing. At the same time, the chances of someone being hurt or killed by Boeing’s negligence are non-zero, so the public interest at large is served by ensuring that Boeing is not allowed to put out a dangerous product.
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As you have convinced me, my boycott is little served.
The public’s interest at large, is clearly non-existent.
The issues at Boeing are well advertised, well publicized, and well known. The flying public is clearly willing to accept the risk with no new regulations, no new agencies and no new changes.
I admit, I would have thought different, but I have been proven wrong.
Fly Boeing!
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…but as you pointed out, the non-zero value is “vanishingly small.” So why such intense and prolonged furore over a vanishingly small probability, one that already is well within what is acceptable per engineering standards? Because the news media has whipped up the general public—and professionals in the aviation industry who ought to know better—into an irrational frenzy that has resulted in an absurd ad hoc set of standards when it comes to aerospace transportation—nothing short of perfection is acceptable. THAT is why NASA adopted a new and arbitrary standard for assessing Starliner, they couldn’t dare risk bringing the astronauts home because the slightest glitch would have triggered all kinds of accusations of irresponsibility and willful neglect and putting profit before human lives and corruption and… a CONGRESSIONAL HEARING. Oh Lord. Face it: if those astronauts had come home and two months later one of them died in a car crash on the New Jersey turnpike, we wouldn’t blink an eye; just another one of the not so vanishingly small number of 40,000 people who die EVERY YEAR in the U.S. in a motor vehicle transport. Is it because a human life when traveling in a car is so much less glamorous and worth nothing or because we are too stupid to see how we are being manipulated by the news media?
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A scrutiny of what appeared to be a litany of revelations against Boeing since the first MAX crash in 2018 shows that the “well advertised, well publicized, and well known” “issues” were fabrications, misunderstandings and exaggerations by the news media, Congress, the general public and even professionals in aviation. The motives of the vast number of individuals acting independently vary, but their behavior had one common characteristic—each pretended competence in areas where they had little to none; each unwittingly used mere common sense in lieu of the advanced education needed to comprehend complex subjects in aviation or business and then aired the plausible-but-false understandings and conclusions that were bound to ensue. In the absence of contradiction, the layperson—armed with only common sense—found the plausible nonsense to be believable truth. Thus the collusion-like synergy of so many people behaving badly resulted in the tsunami of global negative perception of Boeing.
The notion that Boeing “hid” the need for simulator training for MCAS—the sole issue at the heart of the DOJ’s indictment of Boeing—was started by pilots, yes, four-striped Captains at a major airline, who claimed that as pilots they need to know about everything that goes on with the airplane, thus Boeing had deprived them of critical info they needed to fly the airplane.
That was at best a humorous notion, at worst it was fodder for a media looking for a sensational click-bait headline. They didn’t stop to consider that MCAS had—and still has—absolutely no human interface by which a pilot could control it, monitor it or even be aware that it existed (and didn’t need to)… no messages, procedures, gauges, levers, buttons, knobs, not even an ON/OFF switch. When it operated there was no flight deck effect… no G forces, the controls felt as expected, the only tell-tale sign—the trim wheel spinning for 3 or 4 seconds—was not differentiable from the Speed Trim System operation. (If it operated when not necessary, due to an erroneous AOA value, the flight deck effects were very clear: a sudden and increasing pitch down and the trim wheel spinning for a very long time, recognizable by pilots as a runaway stab trim condition, IF they had been trained on that scenario—as required for the basic 737 type rating).
Thus MCAS was “transparent to the pilots,” as Boeing clearly stated in the memo seeking FAA concurrence to remove all mention of it from the flight crew operations manual (FCOM). Human factors engineering required the suppression of MCAS from the operations manual… nothing to operate or monitor, no training possible, don’t mention it.
Yet the DOJ quoted from that memo in their indictment:
"On or about January 17, 2017, an employee of THE BOEING COMPANY emailed an employee of the FAA AEG about the 737 MAX FSB Report, stating in part, “Flight Controls: Delete MCAS, recall we decided we weren’t going to cover it [. . .] since it’s way outside the normal operating envelope.”
Yup, the ellipsis […] is the glossed over part of the memo that says “because it is transparent to the pilots.” Including those words would have raised eyebrows. That is just the tip of the iceberg. The case against Boeing has not just been a charade, it is massive fraud on the order of hundreds of billions of dollars, and counting. It’s not that the public interest is non-existent, it’s that the public interest is whatever sensational click-bait shows up on their smartphone, valid or not doesn’t matter. We’ve stopped using that executive function of trying to discern truth from fiction and reserving our fury for things that are genuinely a threat. Because making a racket and letting everyone know we have a voice and freedom of speech—never mind the content of our speech—has never been easier and felt so good. So good that it has become addictive for many.
You misunderstand, Pete P. As an individual, I have little chance of being killed by a fatal manufacturing or engineering error in an airplane. For the flying public as a whole, however, there is a high likelihood that someone will be killed by that error - and given the nature of commercial air travel, many people at the same time (e.g., Indonesia and Ethiopia).
If you’re willing to stand up and say that a certain level of fatal errors in transport aircraft design and construction are acceptable, then that’s your right - and I hope that my life never has to depend on your efforts. For myself, I think the right number is zero, especially when those errors can be avoided by management not putting their hands over their eyes and ears and wishing the problems away.
We don’t know yet who failed on making sure the door plug bolts were installed, but we need to know so that it doesn’t happen again. Congress, having oversight of the FAA, is doing exactly what it should do to investigate the failure and see what can be done to prevent future occurrences.
Both FAA and Boeing are bureaucracies with attendant failures.
Some great people, some of them retire early every time the US Congress plays games with funding.
Boeing is commendably trying to simplify processes and better integrate safety systems (my words), plus instill sound values in employees. The IAM strike will greatly impeded progress, I predict.
Remember the MCAS fiasco occurred because Boeing did not follow its safety review process as the design morphed from a nudge to aggressive - and no one in authority seriously questioned the change. (Engineering leaders should have.)
Congress may be investigating the FAA over the 737 MAX and door plug issues because, you know, both Boeing and the FAA managed to lose public trust after two deadly 737 MAX crashes. Some folks think the FAA should’ve been better at overseeing Boeing’s safety practices—though let’s be real, the FAA isn’t your momma. Investigating this door plug problem now is a great way to show that, yes, safety standards are totally being enforced this time around, and past mistakes are ancient history. And, facetiously speaking, it does make you wonder: does this sudden surge of accountability have anything to do with an upcoming election? Coincidence? Probably not.