system
The Australian investigation page can be found here: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2019/aair/ao-2019-026/
The Australian investigation page can be found here: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2019/aair/ao-2019-026/
Unless there has been a more recent bulletin, the compliance time for 210s is 1500 hours for 210s flown in "severe usage, and 2500 hours for 177s flown in severe usage. If not flown in severe usage the "typical usage"compliance times apply which are 4000 hours for cantilever 210s and 15000 hours for the C-177s.
Severe usage is defined as: (a) Severe Usage Environment
1 If the average flight length is less than 30 minutes, then you must use the SEVERE
inspection time limits.
2 If the airplane has been engaged in operations at low altitudes such as pipeline
patrol, fish or game spotting, aerial applications, police patrol, sightseeing, livestock
management, etc. more than 30% of its life you must use the SEVERE inspection
time limits.
(b) Typical Usage Environment
If 1 or 2 above does not apply, the TYPICAL usage
environment applies.
Best,
Steve
What’s on the back of the plane in the picture?
If I may, because I read it in mainstream news, the story didn’t unfold exactly as you say: Actually, Spanish ATC lost radio contact with the flight soon after it entered cruise, and notified French ATC. The French scrambled a Rafale (which is standard procedure for unresponsive flights), which made visual contact. The fighter’s pilot indicated that he was seeing “no one in the cockpit”, which probably meant that the pilot had collapsed. The flight was followed along its filed (and probably programmed) flight plan, briefly crossed the Belgian and Dutch borders, then a German Eurofighter took over when it entered German airspace and followed it until it overshot Cologne and crashed into the Baltic, probably from fuel exhaustion. The Spaniards said that in his last communication, the pilot had mentioned having pressurization problems.
Like the Helios B737 Cyprus-Greece,which was entirely caused by a failure of the crew to use the Boeing checklist which would have ensured pressurisation was set for flight, PACKS ON FLIGHT. (flight ground switch goes from ground to flight) followed by a complete failure to check cabin alt & rate of climb passing FL100. I was a 737 type rating instructor and examiner at he time, when chatting to a former BA chum who had just left Helios, his firm advice to me “Don’t buy a ticket” So I didn’t. The single crew jet operation is something I experienced in single seat fighters, never in a commercial operation, so I’m unable to offer an opinion on its safety or security. Did have a total sudden pressurisation failure in a BA 737-200 but that was a long time ago.
Unfortunate since the aircraft is designed to allow pilots to survive such an event. I’ve flown with a lot of single-pilot owner/operators and many of them practice emergency oxygen only once a year for their recurrent training and I never saw any of them actually test oxygen delivery, just the mechanics of donning the mask and flicking the lever. Sloppy maintenance and checklist use could also have set the pilot up with a system that didn’t work as designed. I look at these the same as CFIT though - they should never happen, and yet they do. People forget how fragile they are and get careless…
I am wondering if the lack of actual Emer mask training with sim providers in pressurized airplanes due to Covid the last few years is creating a situation where more of these accidents are starting to occur. I like to check not only if there is O2 flow in Emer mask but also to see the quick donning straps inflate properly. I have seen where the mask has O2 flow but the inflatable straps on a quick donning type won’t properly inflate.
One would think an aural/visual cabin altitude warning would be sufficient to alert the crew. The cabin altitude gauge also needs watching. If this was a Rapid Decompression, then all Hell breaks loose with fog/debris/ears popping/warnings and screams (If applicable.) In an Air Force Altitude Chamber, I was trained for those procedures, but my ear block during the Hypoxia Descent Phase nixed my attendance in the RD segment. I did see what happens during such events.