October 2019
What comes drifting up from the depths of the events surrounding the Max, is the way that management of economics has become leading above management of safety in the aviation industry. This is the case throughout the industry at the moment. Safety management systems seem like the bugee cords for profit…how flexible can we keep those cords before hitting bottom? The whole 737 evolution is driven by costs - type rating comonality and training. The aircraft is inherently safe - but a boundary has clearly been crossed and history has prooven that correcting this happens in the most unforgiving manner.
October 2019
Well… at the very least, moving forward, the position of Chairman of the Board has taken a sidestep or two away from the decision-making “chain of responsibility”.
October 2019
Why does Mr. Muilenburg still have a job? Why is the company taking so long to solve the problem? Perhaps there are more sleeping dogs that have been found. From an outsider’s point of view, it appears that Boeing is more interested in CYA than solving a systemic problem.
In a corporate environment, the leader at the top sets the standards for performance. In this case, there needs to be a new leader to change a poor corporate attitude. Withholding critical information from customers and pilots is inexcusable, those responsible in the decision change need to be removed. Airbus must be very pleased at the floundering going on within the organization. Meanwhile, the airline community and their customers are getting tired of whole fiasco.
Boeing’s Board of Directors has to come to grips with reality and stop damaging the company’s good name. As this drags on, the company is losing valuable credibility which could cause serious business consequences for years to come.
