7 replies
January 2020

system

Excuse me! Am I to suppose that the 737 MAX MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) technical problems have been solved, and that all 357 grounded aircraft, and work in progress aircraft, will be allowed by the FAA to be in service by June 2020?

      Why, yes Raf.  “The agency is pleased with Boeing’s progress in recent weeks toward achieving key milestones,” 

But, “The recommendation sent airlines scrambling to find sim time on the handful of MAX-specific simulators scattered around the world.”

     Sims and training programs are in the oven, Raf.

The Administrator will flight test, right?

      Affirm, no sweat, slam dunk, lemme get back to you on this one, Raf. 

Okay!

1 reply
January 2020

system

“Airlines got mixed messages” ??? Isn’t June the Middle of the Year? I don’t see mixed messages unless my calendar is out of wack.

January 2020 ▶ system

system

The botched MCAS was the root cause of two accidents–recognizing that no accident has only one cause. The whole purpose of MCAS was to avoid specific sim training for the MAX. Now, MAX-specific training will be mandated, that purpose is moot. So, why is Boeing even keeping MCAS at all? Don’t keep trying to fix MCAS; scrap it!

2 replies
January 2020 ▶ system

system

Stick-force-linearity certification REQUIREMENTS. Those rules have not gone away.

January 2020

system

I just had a brainwave. Allow the MAX to fly again on the condition that all Boeing executive travel must be done in them. Maybe the corporate culture will change if the bosses have some skin in the game.

January 2020 ▶ system

system

Well, the ROOT cause was a failure of an AoA sensor, was it not? With an overly-empowered MCAS system reacting to bad data, and confused pilots wondering WTF their airplane was doing, and then doing not quite the right thing. A chain of events, TBS, but without a sensor failure, nobody would have known.

1 reply
January 2020 ▶ system

wiley_tom

Thank you, yes AoA sensor which continues to have a high failure rate was the root problem, compounded by the overly-empowered MCAS system and a setup of Trim cutout switch whose function had changed and did not stop the MCAS trimming as expected. Boeing fixed the MCAS system in June of 2019, no one seems to be addressing the AoA issue, the rest developing training and paperwork to satisfying the now embarrassed FAA.